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intellectual incompetence of individuals who were called "idiots" and "insane"
persons. An analysis of the events surrounding this transformation in
justification of the disenfranchising provisions suggests a complex
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participation in electoral politics. The implications of this history for
contemporary disability policy, particularly the protection of voting rights for
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I. WHO ARE "THE PEOPLE"?
One of the central issues in democratic theory and practice is who exactly are
"the People." The historical contest over suffrage rights gives testimony to the
people's understanding of the importance of voting rights. In the United States,
the question of "who votes" historically has been a contentious one because its
answer is so basic to the functioning of a representative democracy. The selection
of political decision makers-perhaps the most significant element of this form of
self-governance-is understood as the vital connection between individual,
group, and national interests and the expression of these interests in the political
system. Only through helping select the political decision makers can the interests
of individuals and groups be given voice.
The nation's history is storied with the demands of disenfranchised groups to
be included in the American electorate. In most cases, the groups have succeeded.
The property-less, immigrants, African-Americans, religious minorities, and
women are among the groups that have fought for, and won, the right to suffrage.
These conflicts occurred in the context of larger economic and social forces and
replicate in political terms the historic struggles to achieve equality in all its
forms.
In the case of disabled people,1 the issue of electoral participation has been
framed primarily in terms of architectural access for persons with mobility
impairments and confidential voting for blind individuals.2 Largely overlooked
are the state laws that exclude from the electorate some individuals with cognitive
or emotional impairments, usually when these individuals have been adjudicated
incompetent or placed under guardianship. Today, a large majority of states
provide for the disenfranchisement of some individuals with cognitive and
emotional impairments-making individuals with disabilities and criminals the
two major exceptions to universal adult suffrage.
State constitutions, statutes, and/or case law governing voter qualifications in
forty-four states disenfranchise some individuals with cognitive and emotional
impairments.3 The affected individuals are categorized using a variety of terms
We will use the terms "disabled people" and "people with disabilities" (and their
variants) interchangeably, though it is important to note that there is no consensus on what
terms are most appropriate. Also, we will use terms such as "idiots" and "insane persons" when
discussing historical events. These terms are no longer accepted in professional and academic
circles.
2 Kay Schriner & Drew Batavia, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Does It Secure the
Fundamental Right to Vote?, POL'Y STUD. J. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with
authors).
3 See Kay Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of
People with Cognitive and Mental Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437, 438-39.
(2000) [hereinafter Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas] (discussing the right to vote in reference
to: the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause; the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Pub.
L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-
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including the following: idiot, insane, lunatic, mentally incompetent, mentally
incapacitated, unsound mind, not quiet and peaceable, and under guardianship
and/or conservatorship.4 Fourteen states use the terms "idiots," "insane," and/or
"lunatics" for identification purposes.5 Thirty-two states identify individuals on
the basis of mental incompetency and mental incapacity, and one state, "unsound
mind.' 6 Eleven states specifically disenfranchise individuals who have been
placed under a guardianship and/or conservatorship. In the last five years, Alaska,
Idaho, and North Dakota have repealed either their statutory or constitutional
disenfranchising provisions but not the parallel provisions in their respective
statutes or constitutions. 7
Among the six states (Colorado,8 Indiana,9 Kansas, Michigan, New
Hampshire,' 0 and Pennsylvania)" that do not specifically disenfranchise some
individuals with cognitive or emotional impairments, Kansas's 12 and
1(1994)); the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee
(1994); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 120101-12213 (1994)).
4 Id. at 439.
5 Some states have conflicting disenfranchising categories in their respective constitutional
and statutory provisions; therefore, number counts across categories do not equal fifty. Id.
6 Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas, supra note 3, at 439.
7 Alaska's constitution states, "No person may vote who has been judicially determined to
be of unsound mind unless the disability has been removed." ALASKA CoNSt. art. V, § 2 (Lexis
Law Publishing 1998). However, its disenfranchising statute was repealed. ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.05 (Michie Supp. 1999). Idaho permits mental health facilities to deny the right to vote if
the right has been limited by prior court order (IDAHO CODE, § 66-346(a)(6) (Michie 1996)) and
has a similar provision regarding individuals with developmental (IDAHO CODe, § 66-412(3)(j)
(Michie 1996) while its constitutional language providing that people under guardianship,
idiotic or insane cannot vote was removed in 1998. North Dakota's constitution states "no
person who has been declared mentally incompetent by order of a court or other authority
having jurisdiction, which order has not been rescinded, shall be qualified to vote." N.D. CENT.
CODE, § 16.1-01-04 (Michie 1998). While its election statute disqualification was repealed
(N.D. CENT. CODE, § 16.1-01-04 (Michie Supp. 1999), its guardianship scheme provided that
wards may vote unless there has been a specific finding otherwise. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-
28-04(3) (Michie 1996).
8 COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 5 (containing relevant
suffrage provisions).
9 IND. CONST. art. II, § 1 (stating pertinent election requirements).
10 N.H. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (describing election circumstances).
II PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See also PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stating elections will be free
and equal).
12 KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (allowing the legislature to disqualify from voting persons
having mental illness). See also KAN. CONsT. art. V, § I (describing basic qualifications for
electors).
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Michigan's 13 constitutions contain permissive language enabling their legislatures
to enact disenfranchising provisions. The permissive language is not found in
Alaska's 14 Idaho's, 15 or North Dakota's 16 constitutions. Specifically, Kansas's
legislature could disenfranchise based on mental illness and Michigan's based on
mental incompetence. 17 Meanwhile, Colorado's constitution directs the
legislature to secure the purity of elections but does not speak to disenfranchising
individuals with cognitive and emotional impairments as a means to secure
election purity.18
Among the states that disenfranchise some individuals with cognitive or
emotional impairments, only California,19 Florida,20 Hawaii,21 Oregon,2 2 and
Wisconsin23 have constitutional and/or statutory provisions that specifically
address or refer to voting capabilities. However, eleven states have provisions
regarding voting rights in their guardianship and/or conservatorship statutes.24
These provisions address issues such as the following: ability of a guardian or
conservator to restrict a ward from voting, notice requirements about the potential
loss of voting rights upon the filing of a guardianship and/or conservatorship
action, and voting-specific evaluations and/or court findings.25
13 MICH. CONST. art. II, § 2 (permitting the legislature to exclude individuals from voting
due to mental incompetence). See also MICH. CONST. art. II, § I (containing basic qualifications
for electors).
14 ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 1 (stating requirements for electors). But see ALASKA CONST.
art. V, § 3, which permits thejudicial branch to prevent an individual from voting who has been
found to be of "unsound mind" by the courts. Such an individual, however, may vote if the
court determines the "disability has been removed.".
1 5 IDAHO CONST. art. VT, § 2 (describing qualifications for electors).
16 N.D. CoNsT. art. II, § 1 (describing suffrage requirements).
17 See supra notes 12-13 for a discussion of the relevant constitutional provisions for both
states.
18See People e. rel. Attorney Gen. v. News-Times Publ'g Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912
(1906) (holding that Colorado's constitution "confers upon the legislative branch" the duty to
secure the "purity of... elections"). See also COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
19 CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 4 (stating, 'he Legislature shall ... provide for the
disqualification of electors while mentally incompetent").
20 FA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (preventing mentally incompetent individuals from voting until
the disabilityhas been removed).
21 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2 (disqualifying any person who is "non compos mentis" from
voting).
22 OR. CONST. art. II, § 2 (describing individuals who qualify to vote).
23 Wis. CONST. art. III, § 2 (empowering the legislature to enact laws excluding
incompetent or partially incompetent individuals from voting unless "the person is capable of
understanding the objective of the elective process").
24 Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas, supra note 3, at 439.
2 5 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150(e)(6) (Michie 2000) (stating that a guardian may
not prohibit a ward from registering and voting); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302(a)(5) (Michie
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The laws that disenfranchise people with cognitive and mental impairments
are a remarkable example of the use of a disability category in the American
political system. They are seldom discussed, but apparently enjoy broad support.
Many policy makers and members of the public would probably argue that the
laws are necessary to protect the political process against the unreasoned choices
that such individuals presumably would make and the undue influence others
might exert over these individuals. The ease with which such justifications might
be made is evidence of the intransigence of the category in contemporary society.
But what is the history of these disenfranchising provisions? When were they
adopted, and why? Have they been justified on the same grounds over time?
Historically, the disability category in electoral law has not been subjected to
the critical analysis that earlier disenfranchisements of minorities and women or
the contemporary exclusion of felons have been subjected. States' efforts to
prevent Blacks from voting have been well-documented and thoroughly
discussed. Similarly, the long struggle to secure the right to vote for women has
been the subject of interest for many scholars. Scholars have examined the
contextual factors associated with the efforts to overcome racial and gender
prejudice in electoral qualifications, documented the activities of advocates for
expanding suffrage rights, described the registration and voting patterns of the
affected groups, and so on. The collection of important works on these subjects
has resulted in a rich knowledge base that is useful in illuminating our past and
guiding the way into the future.
In contrast to more visible and concerted scholarly efforts on the preceding
groups, there has been little attention paid to the disability category in the context
of voter qualification laws. In this article, we will attempt to shed some light on
the history of the disability distinction. This article will focus on one state-
Massachusetts--to permit a more thorough evaluation of the circumstances
prevailing when the disenfranchising category was originally adopted and during
later changes.
1987 & Supp. 1999) (stating guardian must obtain express court approval to prohibit
incapacitated person from voting); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357(c) (West 1998)
(indicating the incapacitated person may be disqualified from voting); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 1826(h) (West 1991 & Supp. 2001) (stating court investigator may evaluate incapacitated
person to determine if that person is capable of completing an affidavit of voter registration);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331(3)(d)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001) (stating incapacitated person
may be evaluated for voting disqualification); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-5-7(f) (1997) (stating there
shall be independent court evaluation of an incapacitated person's right to vote); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-28-04(3) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (stating wards may vote except upon specific
finding of the court); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 3-113(B)(1) (West 1991) (stating court shall
make specific determination of ward's voting capacity); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.10(D)
(Michie Supp. 2000) (stating proceeding may affect whether incapacitated person is allowed to
vote); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.030(4)(b) (West 1998) (stating incapacitated person
could lose the right to vote); W. VA. CODE § 44A-2-6(d) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2000) (stating
proceeding may affect incapacitated person's right to vote).
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Massachusetts is the proper state to begin this endeavor for several reasons.
First, Massachusetts was one of the original thirteen colonies and the home of
political actors whose influence extended beyond its borders. Second,
Massachusetts was an innovator in developing the precursors of modem social
policy affecting people whose impairments we now call mental illness and
intellectual disability. Finally, Massachusetts's history exemplifies many of the
social, economic, and political trends that shaped the entire nation. The
combination of these factors renders Massachusetts a natural selection for the
beginning of a systemic program of inquiry about the disability category in voter
qualification law.
The problem of deciding who should vote is, as we shall see, inextricably tied
to conceptions of disability, dependency, and deviancy. These connections are
rooted in ideas about who has a stake in society, what interests a state is to protect,
the nature of dependent relationships in colonial and early American times, the
changing constructions of "disability" and their frequent pairing with notions of
moral deficiency and deviancy, and the emergence of a specific "disability
policy" and the disability professions.
II. SUFFRAGE LAW IN COLONIAL AND EARLY
POST-REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
During the colonial period, the common practice in the New World was to
require property ownership as a basis for voting. The right to vote was essentially
"a right to vote as a stockholder in a corporation," 26 though in Massachusetts and
other parts of New England, suffrage was limited to church members and others
of good moral character. The colonies resembled businesses more than political
subdivisions whose concerns were, at first, primarily commercial. However, as
the colonies became more complex and the colonists began to identify themselves
as having more than strictly business interests in common, the property
requirement became less tenable2 7 As the colonies evolved into political entities,
suffrage qualifications defined characteristics that were thought to "determine
capacity to take intelligent interest in community affairs."28 These characteristics
included race, gender, age, religious affiliation, and residence.2 9
Nevertheless, there is no clear distinction to be made in suffrage
qualifications between the periods immediately before and after the Revolution.
As Kirk Porter notes, "1776 is an appropriate date from which to trace the
development of suffrage, not because that date is a landmark of especial
2 6 KIRK HAROLD PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNrrED STATES 2 (1918).
27 Id. at 3.
2 8 Id.
2 9Id. at 3-4.
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importance, but rather simply because 1776 marks the beginning of the United
States as an independent country with a history of its own."30
For many reasons, property ownership was adopted and remained the
preeminent criterion for suffrage during the colonial period and into the post-
Revolutionary period. First, the colonists predictably carried forward English
practices based on the notion that property ownership was a prerequisite for
selfhood.31 Those holding property were believed to be the "repository of virtues
not found in other classes"32-men who would have "a common interest in and a
permanent attachment to society and the state."33
There was also a fear that votes would be controlled through direct and
indirect influence of the wealthy. Renters would be susceptible to the power of
their landlords, and employees subject to the influence of their employers. This
thought replicated ideas already common in England. In his Commentaries on the
Laws of England, Blackstone borrowed Montesquieu's dictum that the "true
reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in voters is to
exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation as to be esteemed to have no
will of their own." 34
Finally, the property qualification was consistent with the emphasis on the
protection of property by government, and the protection of property interests
from government.35 Consistent with the perspective that property interests were
the basis for representation, the idea that government was supposed to be the
shield between a property holder and the threat of confiscation or undue
interference with property use underscored the importance of private property
interests.
As the colonial period ended and the new nation took shape, suffrage
qualifications began to change, though the process was slow. After the
Revolution, all thirteen states still had a property qualification, though only five
still required real property.36 The breakdown of the real estate requirement,
according to Porter, typically occurred in two steps: "first, the substitution of
personalty for real estate, and second, the substitution of taxpaying for property of
any kind."37 The Revolution occurred in the midst of this transition.38
30 Id. at2.
3 1 Marcus Cunliffe, Property, in Im ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY:
STUDIES OFTHE PRINCIPALMOVEMENTs AND IDEAS, 1018, 1018 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1984).
3 2 CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM POVERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760-
1860, at 3 (1960).
33 Id. at 5.
34 1d. at 11 (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES 171).
35 Cunliffe, supra note 31, at 1018.
36 PORTER, supra note 26, at 11.
37 Id.
38Id. at 11-12.
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The major mark of the Revolutionary period was "the breaking down of
religious and moral qualifications." 39 States abandoned these qualifications but at
the same time began to exclude "foreigners, the free negro, and [women]." 40 The
states also established suffrage laws that "began to assume the function of
penalizing men for crime and keeping the polls free of corruption."41
During this same period, states began to develop disability-based exclusions.
Before 1820, only two states (Maine and Vermont)42 had such exclusions, but
more states adopted such measures in subsequent decades. Massachusetts did so
in 1821 with its prohibition on voting by persons under guardianship, Virginia
disqualified persons of unsound mind in 1830, and Delaware began to exclude
idiots and insane persons in 1831. 43 Between 1840 and 1860, California, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin had joined in excluding citizens from voting because of disability.44 In
1860, fifteen of the thirty-three states then in the Union, or forty-five percent, had
disenfranchising provisions. 45 By 1880, eleven more states (Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas,
and West Virginia) had adopted constitutional provisions prohibiting voting by
39Id.
40 Id. at 14.
41 1d.
4 2 ME. CONST. of 1819, art. II, § 1 (excluding "persons under guardianship"); VT. CONST.
of 1793, ch. II, § 21 (entitling those "of a quiet and peaceable behavior" the privilege of voting).
The state constitutions appearing in this footnote and infra notes 43-47 can be found in Francis
Newton Thorpe ed., THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTimuIroNs, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, Now OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Government Printing Office 1909) (compiled and
edited under an Act of Congress of June 30, 1906).
43 MASS. CONsT. of 1780, amend. art. 1I (1821); VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14
(excluding "any person of unsound mind"); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § I (excluding any
"idiot, or insane person").
44 CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5 (excluding any "idiot or insane person"); IOWA CONST.
of 1846, art. I, § 5 (excluding any "idiot or insane person"); LA. CONST. of 1845, tit. II, art. 12
(excluding "any person under interdiction"); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5 (excluding any
"person under guardianship as a lunatic, or as a person non compos mends"); MINN. CONST. of
1857, art. VII, § 2 (excluding any "person under guardianship, or who may be non compos
mentis or insane"); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. II, I (excluding any 'idiot, [or] insane person");
OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 6 (excluding any "idiot, or insane person"); OR. CONST. of
1857, art. II, § 3 (excluding any "idiot or insane person"); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 4
(excluding any"lunatic, person non compos mentis, person under guardianship"); Wis. CONST.
of 1848, art. Ill, § 2 (excluding any "person under guardianship, non compos mentis, or
insane').
45 See supra notes 42-44 for the list of the states with a disenfranchising provision by
1860.
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some individuals with disabilities.4 6 These comprised sixty-eight percent of the
states then in the Union. Most of the states adding exclusions between 1860 and
1880 were Southern states that wrote disenfranchising language into their new
constitutions following the Civil War. 47
In this paper, we focus on the Massachusetts experience. In 1821, the
suffrage provision of the original 1780 constitution was amended in two
significant ways. First, the 1780 property qualification was dropped in favor of a
taxpaying qualification; second, "paupers and persons under guardianship" were
excluded from the electorate. This exclusion was justified on a property basis.
Paupers (persons who had no means of self-support and thus were dependent on
public relief) and persons under guardianship (insane persons, drunkards, and
others whose financial affairs were managed by a guardian for the primary
purpose of avoiding dependency on public relief) were viewed as unworthy
because of their economic dependency.
In 1853, when suffrage qualifications were again taken up in a constitutional
convention, the discussion regarding this exclusion had been transformed
dramatically. Now, delegates referred to the exclusion in terms of "idiocy" and
"insanity," emerging terms being used to label people with emotional and
cognitive impairments. The justification had been transformed into one of
intellectual and moral incompetency due to disability, not dependency. True,
people with those impairments were often dependent, but by 1853 the disability
category had taken on a much more contemporary connotation. By 1853, though
the wording of the constitution did not change, "persons under guardianship"
were clearly identified as "idiots" and "insane" persons in delegates' minds.
Disability had taken on a political meaning of its own, distinct from dependency,
but still very much rooted in it.
The Massachusetts experience illustrates the common nineteenth-century
experience of moving away from basing suffrage exclusions on economic
grounds to basing such exclusions on characteristics such as disability, gender,
and race. Colonialists and early American policymakers were experimenting with
various ways of determining who would select their representatives in democratic
4 6 A.A. CONST. of 1867, art. VII, § 3, 4th (excluding "[t]hose who are idiots or insane");
ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, 6th (excluding "[t]hose who are idiots or insane"); FLA.
CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2 (excluding any "person under guardianship, non compos mentis,
or insane"); GA. CoNsT. of 1868, art. II, § 6, 2d (excluding "[i]diots or insane persons"); KAN.
CONST. of 1859, art. 5, § 2 (excluding any "person under guardianship, non compos mends, or
insane"); MISs. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 2 (excluding "idiots and insane persons"); NEB.
CONST. of 1875, art. VII, § 2 (excluding those who are "non compos mends'); NEv. CONST. of
1864, art. II, § I (excluding any "idiot or insane person"); S.C. CoNsT. of 1868, art. VIII, § 2
(excluding those "of unsound mind"); TEx. CONST. of 1868, art. VI (excluding those "of
unsound mind"); W. VA. CONST. of 1861-63, art. III, § I (excluding those "of unsound mind").
47 See ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. VII, § 3, 4th; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, 6th;
GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, 2d, Miss. CONsT. of 1868, art. VII, § 2; S.C. CONST. of 1868,
art. VIII, § 2.
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institutions. The debates exposed how the standards and biases of the time
interacted to exclude first, those without real property, and later, via categories
serving in some respects as proxies for the property-holding requirement many of
the same groups excluded under the property-holding requirement.
However, these new exclusions also disclose emerging ideas about the nature
of voting (was it an obligation based on protecting the interests represented by the
voter, or the right of an individual to participate in representative government?)
and the character of immigrants, women, blacks, and, also, dependent people of
whom some were disabled. As the democratic institutions of the new nation took
shape, so did the standards for being a new democratic citizen. Only those who
possessed the requisite moral and intellectual competence (first indicated by
property ownership, later by taxpaying, and still later by categories based on
individual characteristics) would be allowed to vote. Voting was being
transformed from a means of protecting the rights of property-holders to a
mechanism for representing the interests of individuals. As this notion took hold,
the complementary effort to define and categorize individuals whose interests
could be looked out for by others, or who were simply unable to protect their own
self-interest because of incompetency, was well under way.
ImI. THE COLONISTS SOW THE SEEDS OF
THE GuARDIANSIP EXCLUSION
Massachusetts began its history as a collection of small settlements of English
Puritans. Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, the first two of these settlements,
were established in 1620 and 1630, respectively, as the Puritans fled English law
and sought the freedom to put into practice their understanding of God's will. The
two collections of Puritans differed somewhat in their ideas about English
religious traditions. The Plymouth Puritans had broken from the Anglican Church
and thus had no government charter, while the Massachusetts Bay settlement had
been granted a company charter by King Charles I in 1629.48 The conditions they
encountered upon landing on the shores of New England had the effect of
minimizing such differences. The commonality of economic hardship, the
similarity of Biblical interpretation, and the belief that the community should be
constructed to implement God's law, became more important than any strategic
differences in relation to the English crown. By the time they had established their
respective settlements, it was evident that "this body of people were to an
exceptional degree bound together by the consciousness of their common faith." 49
One difference between the two settlements is, however, notable. The
Massachusetts Bay colony, established by the Massachusetts Bay Company
4 8 ALBERT EDWARD MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH
COLONIES IN AMERICA 300,337-338 (1905).
4 9 RALPH BARTON PERRY, PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY 73 (1944).
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trading company, was governed by stockholders (freemen) who met four times a
year to establish laws governing company and colonial affairs and to elect
company "officials" (governor and assistants).50 The 1629 Charter had not
specified the freemen's meeting location and, shortly after the establishment of
the colony, the colonists argued for the meetings to be held in New England, thus
creating a "political commonwealth"-a development that turned out to be
momentous in the history of the republic.51 The failure to state a meeting place in
the original company charter is thought by some to have been not merely an
oversight, but a purposeful attempt to use the royal charter as a pretext for
establishing the theocracy of the Puritan mind. John Winthrop, the first Governor
to hold office under the newly transferred charter, 52 compared the Massachusetts
Bay Colony to other colonies declaring that "[tihose planters go and come chiefly
for matter of profit; but we came to abide here, and to plant the gospel, and people
the country, and herein God hath marvellously blessed us."53 In commenting on
this and other evidence of the Puritans' intentions, Albert McKinley concludes
that "[t]he absence of any stated meeting place for the company is now believed
to have been the result of conscious endeavor" to eventually transfer power to the
New World.54
The Plymouth Puritans, in contrast, established their version of theocracy
with "no organic or legal connection with the English government."55 The
Plymouth Puritans' journey to the New World was funded by a London-based
company formed for this purpose; but in 1626, the Londoners' shares were
bought out by the colonists, producing much the same result as had the
Massachusetts Bay colonists' charter transfer.56 In both cases, the events
transferred power to the colonies, and also equated the company with the
geographic entity of the colony itself and its new political rights of self-
determination.57
A. The Puritan Theocracy
The most important characteristic of the colonies was their religious
grounding. In this respect, the significance of the Puritans' history as English
5 0 EDMUND SEARs MORGAN, INvENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 43 (1988). The "officials" included a governor and
eighteen assistants. Id
51 ALBERT EDWARD MCKINLEY, supra note 48, at 302.
52 MAR€H= CHUT, TH FiRsT LIBERTY 59 (1969).
53 GEORGE H. HAYNES, REPRESENTATION AND SUFFRAGE IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1620-
1691, at 11 (Herbert B. Adams ed., Johns Hopkins Press 1894).
5 4 MCKINLEY, supra note 48, at 302.
5 5 Id. at 337-38.
56 Id. at 340.
57 Id. at 339-40.
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people can hardly be underestimated. Their experiences under English rule had
convinced them that the "centralized, hierarchical, and universal" nature of the
Anglican and Roman Catholic churches was inconsistent with the New
Testament model of the church, in which the body of Christ is the church itself.5 8
Furthermore, the Puritans believed that church membership should be restricted
and admittance should be granted only to those who lived their lives in accord
with Christ's teachings. 59
The outgrowth of this experience under English rule was a "theology [that]
was profoundly political," and a body of religious thought that "was infused with
such concepts as power, participation, and autonomy." 60 Thus, the Puritans were
as much concerned with political affairs as with religious ones. Their concerns
about how the church was to be governed were essentially political, for the church
was a predominant force in English life during that period. The issues of
privilege, hierarchy, and decision making, as they were related to church doctrine,
were also related to the community as a whole because of the virtual unity of the
religious and the political bodies. Puritan objections to the Anglican and Roman
Catholic churches centered on the way that power "issued from the central
authority down to local congregations; that authority was made up of ranked
church officers (bishops, cardinals, etc.), and that everyone in a certain area was
either admitted to the church or required to be a member of it."'61
In the New World, the Puritans reformulated their theoretical criticism of the
Anglican and Roman Catholic churches into an "alternative structure of small,
autonomous churches in which the membership, not the church officers, had
sovereign authority."62 Membership gave one the right to voice opinion in the
conduct of the church's affairs. Further, town and church were virtually the same
entity. "From 1631 to 1634 all members of the Massachusetts company were
members of the General Court;" or governing body.63 And, beginning in 1631, all
freemen were required to be church members.64 Their political ideals revolved
around their religious ideals, and having political freedom meant essentially the
right to put into practice these religious principles. Their new world would be a
"city upon a hill" with "the eyes of all people" upon them.65
5 8 JOSHUA MILLER, THE RISE AND FALL OF DEMOCRACY IN EARLY AMERICA, 1630-
1789, at 24 (1991).
59 Id. at25.60 Id. at23.
61 Id. at24.
62 Id. at 25.
6 3 Id. at 27.
64 MCKNLEY, supra note 48, at 304.
65 John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, in THE AMERICAN PURrANS, 78, 83
(Perry Miller ed., 1956).
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A central feature of Puritan life was "the covenant," described by Stephen
Patterson as "a contractual arrangement among the members of the church or the
members of the society whereby they defined their relationship with one another
and with the community as a whole."'66 The men of the community "agreed to
subordinate themselves to a civil government which would govern according to
God's law."67 This covenant was not so much a societal creation as it was the
only logical way to impose God's natural law, an order instituted "after the Fall of
Adam by divine degree in order to restrain what otherwise would be the anarchic
ravages of depravity. '68 The covenant was the inevitable outgrowth of combining
the religious and the political order. In the words of John Winthrop, the Puritans
were required to "seek out a place of cohabitation and consortship, under a due
form of government both civil and ecclesiastical."69
Not only did the covenant make the rule of God supreme over the religious
and political community, it also subordinated individual interests to the common
good. Public needs were more important than the needs and concerns of any
single community member. As Governor Winthrop stated, "the care of the public
must oversway all private respects ... for it is a true rule that particular
[individual] estates cannot subsist in the ruin of the public."70 This subservience
of private concerns was not so much a purposeful choice as it was an accepted
component of the theological perspective. God's will, and its implementation in
public affairs, was the predominant consideration. The private interests of
individuals were insignificant by comparison and hardly merited attention.
Consistent with the limited heed paid to private interest were the limitations
placed on individual freedom. People could do as they pleased only so long as
their actions were congruent with the greater good. Personal opinions and
concerns were tolerated if they were expressed in a way that furthered the
religious goals of the community. Otherwise, members of the church were
expected to suppress their opinions and concerns.
Further, the covenant allowed for inequality based on social and economic
status. Governor Winthrop, who was antidemocratic in many of his views, stated,
"God Almighty in His most holy and wise providence hath so disposed of the
condition of mankind as in all times some must be rich, some poor; some high
and eminent in power and dignity, others mean and in subjection." 71 An early
pamphlet by Jonathan Edwards spoke of the "beauty of order in society" when
"the different members of society have all their appointed office, place, and
6 6 STEpHEN E. PATrERSON, PoLrIcAL PARTIES iN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACHUSETTS 11
(1973).
67Id.
68 John Cotton, Limitation of Government, in THE AMERICAN PURITANs, supra note 65, at
84. 69 Winthrop, supra note 65, at 82.
70Id.
71 Id. at 79.
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station, according to their several capacities and talents, and every one keeps his
place, and continues in his proper business." 72 William Cooper compared the
heavenly order to the political order, saying:
If we look around the Earth, we see it is not cast into a Level; it has Mountains and
Plains, Hills and Valies. Even so in the poliical World, there are the Distinctions of
Superiours and Inferious, Rules and Ruled, publick and private Orders of Men: Some
sit on the Throne of Majesty, some at the Council Table, and some on the Bench of
Justice; and some hold subordinate Places of Power, while others serve their
Generation only in a private Capacity.73
Positive law was the mechanism to realize God's purpose, and the purpose of
the Puritan leadership was to discern His will in the particular laws by which the
community was governed. The function of a legislator, then, was not to discern
what was important among his constituents or to exercise independent judgement
about how best to represent their interests; these practices would have been
foreign. The purpose of governing was to make positive law consistent with
God's greater purpose. Thus, the lawmaker affirmed the natural law's presence
and reflection in the positive law. This reflected the medieval tradition in which a
legislature "interchangeably exercised legislative, judicial, and executive
powers." 74 A legislator often acted as a judge, taking on such issues as the proper
placement of boundaries between towns and the proprietary rights to rivers and
streams.75 Thus, a legislator in the General Court of Massachusetts had to be
above the self-interested pursuits of individuals and, instead, represent the
common good of all the people.
Puritan thought, then, afforded legitimacy to class distinctions, the use of
government as a means to achieve God's ends, and the subservience of individual
interests to the common good. These ideas are apparent in the ebb and flow of
political thought as Massachusetts participated in the American Revolution and in
the decades after, though in somewhat different forms and with fluctuating
influence.
B. Suffrage in Colonial Massachusetts
The Puritans' ideas about the formation and governance of a church
influenced their practices in forming and governing their towns. Indeed, the town
and church were almost "indistinguishable" in the Puritan mind.76 But, while
72 PATIERSON, supra note 66, at 12.
73 RICHARD D. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY POLmcs IN MAsSACHUSETTS: THE BOSTON
COMMnTEE OF CoRRESPONDENCE AND THE TowNs, 1772-1774, at 9 (1970).
74 PATrERSON, supra note 66, at 15.
75 Id. at 16.
76 MILLER, supra note 58, at 27.
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these innovations were radical for their time in expressing the democratic
aspirations of these religious communities, we must also recognize that Puritan
laws governing participation in both town and church consciously excluded many
male adults.
Immediately after the establishment of the Plymouth colony, freemen (men
with ownership in the company) were permitted to participate in elections, but
other men (those not stockholders, called "particulars") were not.77 After 1626,
when the colonists bought out the interests of London shareholders, the
stockholder distinction was dropped in favor of inhabitancy.78 Suffiage rights
were then controlled by the granting of inhabitancy.79 But the conduct of some
inhabitants raised concerns about their moral fitness, and officials began to
evaluate more carefully men's characters when deciding whether to admit them to
the colony.80 Additionally, qualifications for freemanship (including application
to the general court, a term of probation, and the taking of a freeman's oath) were
imposed to ensure that undesirables were not admitted.81 Finally, religious
qualifications were imposed in mid-century to exclude Quakers and their
sympathizers.82
In the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the charter granted by Charles I provided
for the selection of a governor, a deputy-governor, and eighteen assistants by the
corporation's freemen.83 The freemen, who were to meet in general court, were
empowered to admit new freemen; it was by virtue of this prerogative that the
Puritans hoped to enforce political fidelity to their religious views. 84 After
company operations were moved to New England in 1629 and the colonists
began to realize that the transfer of power from England to the New World
presented new, unexplored options for self-governance, the question of the
settlers' role in colonial governance began to fester and shape subsequent
events. 85 Even in the first few years, the Massachusetts Bay colony was facing
pressure from settlers who were not members of the church. After all, the number
of freemen in 1630 did not exceed fifteen, but more than one hundred men
requested to be admitted as freemen.86 Given the virtually unlimited power of the
General Court and its officers, which had "full and absolute power and authority
77 MCKINCEY, supra note 48, at 339 (explaining that "particulars"-males who did not
own stock-"came out at their own risk and expense, and hence did not form a part of the
communistic enterprise").
7 8 Id. at 340.
79 Id. at 340--42.
80 Id. at 343-44.
8 1 Id. at 345.
82Id. at 346.
83Id. at 302.
84 Id.
85 Id
86 Id. at 303.
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to correct, punish, pardon, govern, and rule,"87 it was perhaps natural that those
with no voice in the Court's decisions would develop a growing desire to achieve
some influence there.
The impetus for democratic reforms was, in part, the oligarchic decisions of
the freemen in 1630. At the General Court's first meeting, the freemen
relinquished their right to choose the governor and deputy-governor, giving this
right to the eighteen assistants they would still select.88 Six months later, the
freemen voted to allow decisions to be made by only five of the assistants, and
sometimes fewer.89 The influence of the new governor, John Winthrop, perhaps
explains these actions. Winthrop was, despite his representations of the Puritan
church as a democratic institution, profoundly antidemocratic. 90
Under the Charter of 1691, a new, non-commercial corporation was founded,
and the religious qualification abolished.91 At the same time, though, a universal
property requirement was adopted which permitted only those owning freehold
land or other property of a certain value to vote.92 The centrality of this
qualification in Puritan thought is indicated by the fact that it persisted until the
Revolution. In colonial Massachusetts immediately before the Revolutionary
War, the property requirement stood at "real estate yielding an annual income of
forty shillings"93 or "other property worth forty pounds." 94 The property
requirement serves as evidence that the state of financial self-sufficiency was
associated with the ability to manage one's affairs and to participate in the
community's governance.
Adherence to strict moral codes was also important. The selectmen freely
disciplined those whose behavior was disruptive and threatened to impose an
obligation on the town. This discipline sometimes included being evicted from
the corporation, as happened to four male freemen named Barnes, Newland,
Howland, and Beare, who were:
convicted by law, and sentanced by the court to bee desfianchised of their freedome
of this corporation; the said John Barnes, for his frequent and abominable drnnkenes,
and William Newland and Henery Howland for theire being abettors and entertainers
of Quakers [who were considered to be morally inferior because of their religious
views], contrary to the aforesaid order, likewise Richard Beare, of Marshfield, for
being a grossly scandalouse pson, debaughed, haueing bine formerly convicted of
87 HAYNES, supra note 53, at 8.
88 Id. at 13.
89 Id. at 13-14
90 Id.
91 MCKNEY, supra note 48, at 353. The new corporation was christened"Province of the
Massachusetts Bay in New England." Id
92 1d. at 354.
93 PoRTER, supra note 26, at 9.
94 Id. at 10.
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filty, obseane practises, and for the same by the Court sentanced ... he was likewise
sentanced to bee disfranchised of his freedome of this corporation.95
Being expelled from the corporation meant that one was expelled from the
governing body. The moral and political statuses of church members who had
violated the behavioral codes of the community were diminished. Furthermore,
town selectmen possessed much discretion in enforcing moral and political
standards.
Because of the importance of self-sufficiency (as will become more apparent
in the next section), the colonists valued highly the ability to provide for oneself.
While the political consequences of being thought of as incapable of managing
one's affairs are not well-documented, Robert Brown relates a story about two
candidates in a close race for public office in 1757.96 Each candidate's supporters
challenged the other candidate's claim to victory, and allegations of corruption
and bribery "flew thick and fast."'97 Among the challenges was a challenge to one
voter on the basis of competence. A town selectman defended the voter by saying
that the voter "was not 'non compos mentis,' as accused, but merely had a
guardian because he drank too much. ' 98 In the House of Representatives'
subsequent deliberations to decide the race, Brown reports that all voters were
presumed competent.99 This incident suggests that one competence standard did
revolve around the ability to manage one's business affairs, and also underscores
the fact that guardians were appointed for a variety of reasons, including
drunkenness, insanity, and being a spendthrift.
The political culture of colonial Massachusetts supported these various
practices. Colonial ideas about individualism were quite different than
contemporary notions. The church and its clergy were significant influences on
society, the close-knit nature of families and communities constrained
individuality, and convention dictated personal conduct. As Mary Ann Jimenez
explains, "individual decision making was not strongly valued in many areas of
life. Insofar as deference and consensus characterized the political culture, the role
of individual political choice was deemphasized." 100 It was important that towns
and other geographic areas be represented, but more contemporary notions about
representation based on individual and group interests were only beginning to
gain credence. Further, the early practice of disenfranchising a man because of
9 5 ROBERT W. KELSO, THE HISTORY OF POOR RELIEF IN MASSACHUSETTS 1620-1920,at
32 (Patterson Smith 1969) (1922).
9 6 ROBERT BROWN, MIDDLE-CLASS DEmOCRACY AND THE REVOLUTION IN
MASSACHUSETrs, 1691-1780, at 44-45 (1955).
97 Id. at45.
98 Id. at 44.
99 Id. at 45.
10 0 MARY ANN JDMENEZ, CHANGING FACEs OF MADNESs: EARLY AMERICAN ATrrrUDES
AND TREATMENT OFTHE INSANE 61 (1987).
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drunkenness, associating with Quakers, and immoral behavior101 emphasizes the
importance of moral and intellectual competence that is at the core of early
suffrage law.
At the same time, it may be said that the Puritans' experience foreshadows
the subsequent demands for the expansion of suffrage rights. As Joshua Miller
claims, 'The Puritan experiment itself taught the people that they legitimately
possessed a share of power."10 2 New, more participatory standards for governing
were emerging.
C. Disability, Dependency, and Deviancy in Colonial Social and Political
Organization
Consistent with their theocratic beliefs and their insular focus on the family
was the Puritans' extreme fear of public dependence. Those who became
dependent generally did so because of emotional or intellectual disability,
criminal conduct, or family circumstances such as the death of the head of the
family. Puritan society had not yet developed distinct categories for labeling
dependent people. The labels we now use to differentiate among and between
disability, deviancy, and dependence were largely unformed. At the same time,
the need for such distinctions was beginning to be felt. The colonists realized that
not all dependency was created equal; different forms of dependency appeared to
call for different solutions.
The threat posed by dependency was felt strongly; as Robert Kelso
(sympathetic to the Puritans' motives) argues, "[tihe margin of subsistence was so
narrow that starvation stalked through the dreary months of more than one chill
winter. There was urgent need, therefore, that the settlers guard their hearth-fires
against the indigent and the incompetent."10 3 Pauperism, defined by Kelso as
"willful poverty," had "hung like a millstone" around the necks of English
taxpayers, and the Puritans vowed to enforce discipline by refusing poor relief to
anyone other than those who "could no longer help themselves and had no kin
who owed them support."' 0 4 Further, English Poor Law officials began to
transport criminals and paupers to the colonies as early as 1617, leading the
colonists to enact laws designed to reduce the influx of vagrants into their
towns.105 The settlers viewed these circumstances as quite threatening and took
steps to decrease the likelihood that dependency would place so great a burden on
101 KELSO, supra note 95, at 32.
102 MILLER, supra note 58, at 28.
103 KELSO, supra note 95, at 37.
104 Id. at 33.
105 Id. at 42.
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a town that the town's very existence would be threatened, though at least one
scholar has suggested that this threat may have been exaggerated. 06
1. Settlement Laws and Access to Public Aid
The colonists accomplished their purpose of controlling the provision of
public aid in three main ways. First, colonial towns instituted laws of settlement
that specified the conditions under which strangers could be admitted to town
inhabitancy. Inhabitancy was legal residency, and legal residency was required
before public aid was granted. The laws of settlement determined 'jurisdictional
responsibility for public expenditures made on account of persons in distress."1 07
Second, the towns routinely "warned out" strangers, actively seeking to avoid
accepting new arrivals into their midst, with the hope that strangers would choose
to move on to the next town (where they might again be warned out).10 8 Third,
the colonies also routinely required that newcomers request permission, which
was often refused, to reside in a particular town; and towns also required that
property owners seek approval from the authorities before selling property to a
stranger. 10 9 The historical record is clear that settlement laws were used to rid the
colonies of many kinds of undesirable persons, including those considered mad.
For example, John Winthrop's diary includes a note concerning "One Abigal
Gifford, widow,... [who was] found to be somewhat distracted and a very
burdensome woman" who was returned to the ship on which she traveled to the
colony.110
The development of settlement laws was the primary mechanism for
controlling both the religious makeup of the town's residents and the town's
responsibility for the dependent, though the concern about dependency seems to
have been the more important.111 Inhabitancy was granted only to those with
suitable religious beliefs and who could be shown to belong to a family unit.
Every member of the town, with the sole exception of free adult males, was
required to belong to a family. Children, servants, and women had to be bound to
a master, who in turn was responsible for their support. 112 The belief that the
family bore the responsibility for the care of its members was a central tenet of
Puritan social and political organization. Thus, only church members who were
106 See GERALD N. GROB, THE STATE AND THE MENTALLY ILL: A HISTORY OF
WORCEsTER STATE HosPrrAL IN MASSACHUSETrs, 1830-1920, at 5 (1966).
107 KELSO, supra note 95, at 35.
108 Id. at 50.
109Id. at 41.
110 WALTER I. TRATrNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA 25 (6th ed. 1999).
111 KELSO, supra note 95, at 35.
112 Id. at 30.
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members of families were eligible for public aid should they fall on hard times
and require such assistance.
The reliance on the family to maintain discipline and independence was of
paramount importance in the Puritan communities. Given the small size of the
towns, the common ownership of public land, and the self-reliant philosophy, the
centrality of family can be seen as entirely consistent with other practices of the
earliest Massachusetts settlers.
2. The Principle ofLocal Responsibility
The colonists employed the settlement law to govern the provision of public
aid, thus associating legal inhabitancy with a right of access to public assistance.
Chief among the principles of poor relief was that the responsibility for such aid
was local. Locating the liability for aid in the town was natural for the colonists.
The town was:
where he has dwelt and had his home; where he has earned and spent his wages;
where his children have gone to school; where the ties of his everyday life bind hin:
that is his home, and, should he come to distress, that is the group of neighbors who
should, as against others more remote, rally about him to set him on his feet.1 13
The significance of the settlement law was its use 'to attempt to construct strict
boundaries between individuals whose inhabitancy made them eligible for aid
during times of need and individuals who were ineligible for aid.
Aid might take many forms and be partial or complete. Some dependent
persons were placed with families who agreed to care for them for a time with the
cost to be paid out of town funds.1 14 When persons were not totally dependent
they might receive a gift of land for the building of a home, permission to conduct
trade on the sidewalk,115 or the abatement of taxpaying obligations.116 Often,
dependents were provided health services without charge1 17 In more severe
cases, when one was completely without resources, the shape of aid was much
less desirable. Dependents, no matter whether men, women, or children, might be
auctioned off to the bidder willing to provide them room and board at the lowest
cost to the town.1 18 When dependents could work in exchange for the aid, they
were expected to work Another formal version of this arrangement was the
indenturing of needy persons.119
113 Id. at 92.
1 14 TRATINER, supra note 110, at 18.
115 KELSO, supra note 95, at 39.
116 TRATrNER, supra note 110, at 18.
117 Id. at 18-19.
118Id. at 18.
119d. at 22.
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Decisions about who would be provided help and the kind of assistance to be
given were made first by town selectmen on an individual-by-individual basis,
and later by overseers.120 Town selectmen eventually found that dealing with the
poor was too demanding. By 1691 in Boston, for example, selectmen decided to
appoint four officers whose sole responsibility was to oversee the care of
dependent persons,121 partly because the public burden was increasing
dramatically. Boston residents spent about 500 pounds on poor relief in 1700, but
by 1715 the annual cost had risen to 2,000 pounds, and in another twenty years
the cost doubled.122 By the mid-1700s, Bostonians were facing poor relief costs
of 10,000 pounds yearly and the cost continued to grow, even when the
population did not.123
Around 1800, public almshouses began to appear.124 This indoor relief (as
opposed to the outdoor relief of placement in private homes, apprenticing
dependent children, etc.) became favored as the problem of dependency deepened
in the colonies. 125 Almshouses were thought to be more effective in imposing
discipline on the poor-a step believed necessary for restoring the productive
capacity of dependents. 126 Decisions about poor relief were complicated, though,
by the realization that there were many causes of dependency and many different
kinds of people who became dependent. Almshouses and jails, the other major
institution for dealing with deviancy, were crowded with widows, children,
people whom we would now label as intellectually impaired or mentally ill,
criminals, and others who drank too much. They "housed little children with the
prostitute, the vagrant, the drunkard, the idiot, and the maniac."'1 27 Partly because
of this unfortunate mixing of the deserving and nondeserving poor, crime and
deviancy were spread. Though the almshouse ultimately failed to achieve its lofty
objectives, it was a significant departure from earlier practices and signaled the
beginning of a new era in policies directed at the dependent poor.
3. The Disability Construct in Colonial Poor Law
The colonists began the slow process of constructing an administrative
framework used to make determinations about who was or was not worthy of
poor relief. The Puritans' concern was hardly new. Beginning around 1500,
economic changes rocked English society. Vagrancy increased as feudal
120 KELSO, supra note 95, at 93.
121 TRATrNER, supra note 110, at 30.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas, supra note 3 at 443.
125 TRATINER, supra note 110, chapter 4.
12618d. at 53.
127 KELSO, supra note 95, at 112.
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relationships dissolved and a nascent market economy developed. The dislocation
of economic relations caused social and political instability, and English officials
experimented with ways of controlling the labor force. They searched for ways to
balance the humanitarian needs of those who were unable to work against the
need to force those who could work into the new market economy.
English officials had established the rough outlines for determining
worthiness as early as 1388 when they specified the ability to work as the
criterion for receipt of aid and invested local officials with the power to determine
the work ability of dependent people.' 28 In 1531, the English parliament had
instructed local officials to find the "aged and impotent poor" and register them
for begging within certain geographic boundaries; in 1536, "lepers and bedridden
creatures" were excluded from automatic expulsion from the territories
established for begging.129 Finally, in the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, the
English demonstrated that "a formerly undifferentiated mass of paupers [could]
be understood as comprising several distirct elements" 130 which included
"children, the sick, the insane, 'defectives,' and the 'aged and infirm.""'131 In
making these distinctions, the Poor Law established the "concept of need" as the
"mirror image of the concept of work.' 132 It unified formerly undifferentiated
conditions that were "more unified in the notion of vagrancy than in any concept
of common cause." 133 To put it another way, the English had found a way to
identify those who were unable to work through no fault of their own. This
distinction, though, was not nearly so benign as might be thought because of the
social construction of these disability categories as deviant dependent and at
least vaguely threatening. The deserving poor-those who were provided with
public aid without being required to work for it-were privileged by virtue of not
having to work, but at a considerable cost to their social and political status.
In the Puritans' minds, madness was explained by a combination of
supernatural actors such as the Devil, personal sin, and human biology;134
madness being more likely to visit itself upon those weakened by sinfulness.135
Apparently, insanity, however, was not elevated to the place of a major social
problem in the public's mind. Distraction and other forms of madness, such as
128 DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 36 (1984).
129 1d. at37.
130 Id. at 39.
13 11d. at 40.
132 Id. at55.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 16.
135Id. (stating, 'Ve sinner could be blamed for bringing on his own sensibility by
invoking God's punishment. The Devil could be summoned... as a way of blaiming those
who did not resist his bandishments, or as the overpowering force that swept aside the
rationality of an unwilling victim").
2001]
OHIO STATE L WJOURAL
melancholy and mania, were more likely to be considered oddities of the human
condition that generally could be accommodated in the everyday life of the town.
Most of the mad were not confined during the colonial period, and were
generally cared for by their families. 136 Families provided for them as best they
could, and they were generally accepted by friends and neighbors. Insane people
were probably a common sight in the colonies and were usually tolerated. When
their mental conditions improved, they often returned to their former occupations
and status.137
The few individuals whose situations commanded the attention of public
officials were those who were violent or those for whom families, friends, or
neighbors could not provide. When the insane threatened the social order,
officials were forced to take action, typically by paying for their care in private
homes or confining them to jails or almshouses. The treatment of the insane did
not differ greatly from the treatment of other groups of disabled persons. There
were few hospitals and the physically sick were cared for in their homes. 138
Elected officials had almost complete discretion when making decisions
about insane individuals. Because responsibility for public aid was local, local
towns were invested with the authority to determine who should be subjected to
discipline and be admitted to public aid. A 1678 Massachusetts act ordered town
selectmen with "unruly Distracted persons" to "take care of all such persons that
they do not Darmnifie others" and to:
take Care and Order the Management of their Estates in the Times of their
Distemperature, so as may be for the good of themselves and Families depending on
them; and the Charge be Paid out of the estates of all such persons where it may be
had, otherwise at the public charge of the town such persons belong unto. 139
The act also gave judges the right to liquidate the estates of distracted persons to
cover the cost of their support and to order an insane person to take work to help
pay for the town's assistance.140
The 1678 Act was significant in establishing local responsibility for insane
paupers.141 It indicated the colonial concern with order and dependence, while
also providing some protection for the property of the insane by requiring that
their estates be managed by a guardian.142 This legal framework was furthered by
a 1694 Act, "An Act for the Relief of Idiots and Distracted persons," that
provided:
136 JMNEz, supra note 100, at 49.
137 Id. at 37.
138 Id. at50.
139 Id. at 50-51.
140 Id. at 51.
141 See id at 50-51.
142 Id.
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When any person... by the Providence of God shall fall into distraction and become
non compos mends, and no relations appear that will undertake the care of providing
for them, or that stand in so near a degree as that by law they may be compelled
thereto, in every such case the Selectmen or Overseers of the Poor of the town where
such person was born, or is by law an inhabitant, be and hereby are empowered and
enjoined to take care, and make necessary effectual provisions for the relief, support
and safety of such impotent or distracted persons, at the charge of the town or place
whereof he or she of right belongs if the party has no estate of his or her own, the
incomes whereof may be sufficient to defray the same.143
In discussing the legal principles established by these colonial laws, Jimenez
observes that authorities were rarely asked to control someone who had
"darnnified" another and that they had "little to do" with the determination of
insanity in guardianship cases. 144 Often, guardianship simply involved the legal
sanctioning of an arrangement already made between private individuals. 145
Justices of the peace, however, possessed the authority to use an insane person's
resources to provide for his or her family and to order the insane person to
perform "any proper work or service he or she may be capable to be employed
in" to help pay for his or her care.146 These laws served as a sort of backstop to
prevent an undue financial burden on localities whose insane residents were
violent or indigent.147
By 1736, a law was enacted to specify the procedure for determining mental
incompetence. 14 8 Town selectmen were to decide if an individual was insane.149
The criteria for this determination were not dictated, though the ability to conduct
one's business affairs was apparently critical, particularly for men. 150 Physicians,
who at that time had only a limited interest in insanity, were not involved in the
determination process.' 5 ' When the probate court appointed a guardian,
protection of financial resources was the primary concern. 152 Guardians were
expected to manage the estate "frugally and without waste and destruction and to
provide for the insane and his family out of the income of the estate. ' 153 For the
insane poor, then:
143 Id. at 51.
144 Id
145Id.
146 Id.
147 See id
148 Id. at 57.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 57-58.
15 1 Id. at 57.
1 5 2 See id at 58.
153 Id.
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[t]heir status as paupers was far more important in determining their fate than was
their madness. In general, the financial dependence of the insane was a greater
concern than their insane behavior. The guardianship laws were designed primarily to
ensure that the insane did not become financially dependent; the great care taken to
warn out distracted strangers suggests a related fear of long-term financial
incapacity.154
With respect to idiocy, the colonists' opinions reflected their understanding of
insanity as a form of deviancy and dependency. Indeed, it was not until the
middle of the nineteenth century that idiocy took on a meaning distinct from
insanity. Because colonists' work was primarily agrarian in nature, intellectual
impairments did not have the economic significance that they would later acquire
when work became more individualized and routinized.
Before the American Revolution, then, insanity was considered another
condition of dependence. It was not terribly different from any other circumstance
that thrust someone into a state of economic need. Insanity was not thought of as
a medical condition, but a moral condition. While insanity could cause disturbing
or threatening behavior, it was not subject to professional intervention, but rather
was treated as a religious issue. Insanity was largely a private matter and became
a public concern only when the mad person was violent or indigent.
Public officials during this time embraced the public idea of insanity
primarily as one of dependence. In this respect, there was a fear of insanity but, to
a large degree, this fear had more to do with the fiscal nature of insanity's threat
than with any other kind of threat. In a time of limited public resources, madness
posed the unpleasant prospect of public obligations-obligations that were both
unwanted and difficult to meet.
It seems apparent that the Puritans' primary motive was to ensure the survival
of their colonies by controlling the amount of financial responsibility placed on
the public treasury. The moral rightness of their motives and the quality of their
charity have been variously described as understandable, perhaps justifiable, and
admirably generous given their limited means. Regardless of their motives, their
policies are important for illustrating both the process by which insanity came to
be recognized as a public problem and the approaches taken to dealing with it. By
framing the public nature of insanity primarily in terms of dependency, the
Massachusetts colonists created the pairing of madness with a lack of both
personal and familial economic wherewithal. The relevance of this construction
will become more apparent as we examine subsequent developments in suffrage
law and disability policy.
154 Id. at 59.
[Vol. 62:481
CREATING THE DISABLED CITIZEN
D. The Seeds Are Sown
In Puritan Massachusetts, the seeds of the disability exclusion had been sown.
The Puritans' experiences set the stage for the eventual adoption of a guardian
exclusion in two important ways. First, the use of guardianship status to control
and execute the public responsibility for idiocy and insanity established these
individual differences as both politically and economically problematic. The
potential of incurring public cost to care for the insane and idiots was a constant
source of concern to the colonial town selectmen and helped form their
understanding of disability's political aspects.
Second, the Puritans (and many other early colonists) established the
importance of financial wherewithal in determining who could take part in
governance and who could not. Though qualifications first centered on
membership in the company, by 1691 the colonists had stepped in the direction of
property-based qualifications by instituting a province-wide property requirement
for men who were not church members. In so doing, they set forth the other
important criterion for the eventual adoption of the guardianship exclusion in
1821. By equating insanity and idiocy with dependency and deviancy (through
the use of public guardianship for the violent and dependent insane and the
development of disability categories for specifying the deserving poor), the
Puritans built the foundation on which future lawmakers could exclude
individuals under guardianship.
IV. THE NEW STATE CREATES THE GUARDIANSHIP EXCLUSION
With the colonial period drawing to a close, Massachusetts was still searching
for solutions to the problems caused by dependency, and had decided on a
property suffrage qualification as one element of its governmental system. The
Revolution was fast approaching, and at its end, the new state experienced a
period of rapid change in economic, social, and political conditions. Though the
Puritan domination in state affairs was diminishing, conservative philosophy and
traditions continued to influence public affairs.
In the years immediately preceding the American Revolution, Massachusetts
was awash in uncertainty. When the Provincial Congress convened in October of
1774, circumstances in Massachusetts were "profoundly unsettled." 155 It had
neither written a constitution nor established a government, Boston was occupied
by the British, and there was little hope that the political dispute would be
resolved quickly.' 56 But by 1780, the situation had changed rather dramatically.
155 BROWN, supra note 96, at 237.
156ird.
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John Hancock had been elected governor by the "nearly unanimous vote of his
fellow citizens" and a new constitution promised stability and progress. 157
As the new century arrived and wore on, change proceeded apace. First,
economic conditions took on a different character. Boston traditionally had been
the center of commercial activity, but other towns gradually gained economic
importance by virtue of their whaling, farming, or manufacturing interests.
158
Second, political strife tore at traditional party structures and allowed for new
parties that represented the emerging demands for democratic reforms. Agitation
for more egalitarianism in economic and political affairs confronted the
conservative tradition of Massachusetts politics. Disputes over national banking
policy, representation in the state legislative bodies, suffrage expansion, and
slavery were prominent topics of political discussions. 159 In each case, the central
concern of dissenters was the expansion of opportunity, equality, and
representation for the lower strata of society. Third, immigration produced
profound reconfigurations in the state's social and political make-up. A large
number of immigrants arriving in the nineteenth century were not easily accepted
or accommodated. Housing was inadequate, many employers exploited
immigrant labor, and immigrants' social and religious habits were criticized by
Protestants. 160 Immigration set the stage for serious debates over the moral and
intellectual competence of certain groups. Fourth, the state's role in addressing the
issues of disability, dependency, and deviancy was transformed during this
period. Historically, as we have seen, the state had taken a limited role at most,
but now it began to view the issues as social concerns requiring a concerted
public response. Policy initiatives included experiments with asylums and schools
for persons we would now label as disabled, prison and jails for criminals, and
various programs to control and provide for the poor.
In the remainder of this section, we will describe these events and analyze
their relationships to the adoption of the guardianship exclusion in Massachusetts
voter qualification law. First, we will focus on the coalescence of disability,
dependency, and deviancy as public concerns. Second, we will address the
political dynamics underpinning the 1780, 1820-1821, and 1853 constitutional
conventions in which delegates made decisions about suffrage rights. Such a
discussion is necessary to explain the evolution of justifications for the
guardianship exclusion, from the one in 1820-1821 based on the economic
dependency of persons under guardianship to another in 1853 based on the moral
and intellectual incompetence of "idiots" and "insane" persons.
157 Id.
15 8 ARTHUR B. DARLING, POLITICAL CHANGES IN MASSACHUSEIT 1824-1848: A STUDY
OF LiBERL MovEmENTs iN POLmCS 3-5 (1925).
159 Id. at 130.
160 Id. at 162-64.
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A. Disability, Dependency, and Deviance Coalesce as State Concerns
Between the colonial period and 1853, when the disenfranchisement of
persons under guardianship began to take on its contemporary disability
connotation, Massachusetts changed in many ways. In this relatively short period,
not only did conceptions about the nature and etiology of various forms of
dependency undergo profound change, but so did the nature of public policy
directed at dependent persons.
During this time, a variety of social ills were occupying the public's attention.
Dependency was still viewed as a scourge on society; the cost of providing for
dependents was high, had risen for decades, and was feared to have no ceiling.161
A number of circumstances had caused these miseries. The most important
circumstances included: massive immigration, unavailability of work, wars and
other military engagements, illegitimacy, and epidemics. 162 But while many
citizens supported the provision of relief out of a sense of duty to ameliorate the
conditions of the poor, there was also widespread resentment of the associated tax
burden imposed.163 The fact that taxpayers received a separate bill for poor taxes
only exacerbated the situation. 64
The rising costs of providing for the dependent population created pressure
on public officials, though private charities played perhaps a more prominent role
in poor relief during the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century.1 65
Both the public and private sectors recognized that the problem of dependency
was best addressed in two ways. First, the needs of the poor should be met, albeit
with a mixture of charity and control. Second, poverty should be prevented to the
extent possible. Providing relief for dependent populations was a duty, but many
also believed that the root causes of poverty could be ferreted out and destroyed
by applying the promise of nascent scientific methods and professional expertise
to the human condition.
Initiatives taken by both the public and private sectors to remedy the causes
of poverty and the living conditions of the poor took on new characteristics. A
core premise of these initiatives was that categorization of the poor was necessary
to devise effective policies for ridding society of the problems associated with
poverty. 166 People who could work should be treated differently from those who
could not work.167 As we have seen, this central distinction-between the
161 See TRATrNER, supra note 110, at 30-31.
162 See id.
163 MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 16-17 (1986).
164Id. at 16.
165 TRAT'NER, supra note 110, at 32.
16 6 See KATZ, supra note 163, at 18.
167Id.
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deserving poor who could not work through no fault of their own and the
undeserving poor who did not work because they were immoral-was not a
distinct American invention but rather reflected the earlier English practice. 168
The nineteenth century saw this distinction emerge in public policy in the
United States as it had in English law. The former practice of using the almshouse
as a one-size-fits-all approach for addressing dependency evolved in the direction
of dividing the dependent population into discrete subgroups for different
treatment. 169 Criminals were sentenced to confinement in jails, and the unworthy
poor were sent to poorhouses where they were forced to labor, both to reduce the
financial burden on the public and to improve their character.170 Treatment of the
deserving poor depended on the perceived cause of poverty. People believed to be
insane or idiots were treated differently than widows, orphans, and the physically
ill.
This trend was particularly evident in the case of insanity. The end of the
eighteenth century brought significant change in the way insanity was viewed.
The Puritan preachers who had been so influential in interpreting madness began
referring to it in ways that, while still containing moral judgement, did not
implicate the Devil. Rather, the evolving perception suggested that personal
volition was involved. Surely, God's law was being transgressed, but it was
increasingly portrayed as a function of the individual's religious grounding (or
lack thereof) and moral choices. The "structure of causality," as Jimenez refers to
it, was pulled from its previous roots in the supernatural and re-established in the
ability to reason. 171 The effect of the Enlightenment had been to bring the power
of individual judgement to the fore in explaining madness. Predictably, a
byproduct of this new perspective was the decline of the ministry's influence in
construing the causation of madness and in dictating its cure.
One factor in this new conception of insanity was the slow emergence of the
health profession as an influence on social and political views about madness.
Prominent theorists such as Pinel (a Frenchman), Tuke (an Englishmen), and
Benjamin Rush (an American) were exploring ways of explaining insanity, and
their work was widely read among American intellectuals.1 72 Though they took
quite different approaches, the collective efforts of these men prompted
physicians in Massachusetts and elsewhere to reconsider the causes and treatment
of insanity.' 73 The illness metaphor of madness complemented the ethical
understanding. But the illness etiology also had a distinctly individualized aura
about it. In the American version of the medical explanation (especially as
168 See STONE, supra note 128, at 36.
169 TRATiNER, supra note 110, at 61-62.
170 KATZ, supra note 163, at 22-23.
171 JIMEN.Z, supra note 100, at 29.
172 See GRoB, supra note 106, at 7-12.
173 See id
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espoused by Benjamin Rush), passion played a central role.174 Passions must be
controlled, since an absence of moderation could lead to problems of all kinds,
not the least of which was madness.175 To be mad was to have failed, to have
been unable to exercise control over the more destructive passions, and to have
given into "avarice and ambition," as Benjamin Rush phrased it.176
By the 1830s, Samuel Woodward, the superintendent of Massachusetts's first
public insane asylum, had gained considerable credibility and prominence with
the state legislature and others concerned about the growing social problems
believed to cause, and be caused by, madness. 177 In Woodward's view, there
were two primary reasons people went insane-intemperance and
masturbation.178 Woodward's opinion contrasted with the opinions of other
superintendents of the time179 who held that the poverty-stricken conditions of the
poor and other social ills were the leading causes of insanity.180
The collection of explanations began to coalesce around the notion of
madness as a disease having both voluntary and involuntary dimensions. 181 In
this changing causal formulation, the insane both gained and lost. Now, madness
could be controlled, it was no longer a supernatural curse. 182 Insanity could be
conquered, especially if the insane person was actively engaged in the curative
process. 183 But this new emphasis on rationality and the self led to a reassessment
of blame. The mad were, at least in part, responsible for their own illness.184
This confluence of forces resulted in a profound change in both the
conception of insanity and its place in the public sphere. In the latter decades of
the eighteenth century, towns throughout Massachusetts were beginning to
confine persons believed to be insane 185-in stark contrast to the earlier colonial
practice of intervening only when an insane person was violent or indigent 186
Whereas insane people previously had been sent to almshouses (also called
poorhouses) where they mixed uncomfortably with other dependent or deviant
people, 187 some towns began to separate insane paupers from the remainder of
174 JIMENEZ, supra note 100, at 67--68.
17 5 See id at 68.
176 Id. at 73.
17 7 See id at 83-85.
178 Id. at 83.
179 See id. at 85.
180See id
181 See id at 86-87.
182 See id. at 87-88.
183 See id. at 87.
184 See id. at 89.
185 See id. at9o.
186 See id. at 49-51.
187 See id. at 59-60.
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the pauper population. 188 Significantly, in Salem insane persons confined to the
almshouse were not all paupers, thus breaking the historical connection between
confinement of the insane and their pauper status. 189 In 1796, Massachusetts
lawmakers enacted a law permitting town officials to confine in houses of
correction and jails the "furiously mad or those who were dangerous to the peace
and safety of the good people." 190 There is evidence of adherence to this practice
in many towns. 191 By the late 1820's, it appears that the majority of various town
officials in the state had accepted the apparent necessity of confinement.192 An
1829 report to the state legislature documents this trend, with a total of 289
"lunatic persons" confined by 112 towns in almshouses, private homes, or jails,
with 38 of them in chains.193 Conditions for most insane individuals were barely
tolerable, and many lived in deplorable conditions. 194
The change in treatment of the insane suggests that officials had also adopted
a different attitude toward them. Now, insanity was not just a departure from
God's teachings, but a state brought on by multiple and malleable factors. Social
conditions could be improved and individual characters could be improved, but
insanity was a threat to the social order that justified involuntary confinement.
Still, the evolving stance toward insanity was also characterized by altruistic
motives. Because insanity was taking on the character of illness, many also
believed (at least initially) that it could be cured. The establishment of the asylum
was accompanied by optimism, and it would be decades before that optimism
faded in the harsh light of falling "cure" rates.
The belief in curability was evident in the establishment of publicly funded
insane asylums. After considerable agitation on the part of a reform-minded elite
that included members of the clergy, prominent lay people such as Dorothea Dix,
and increasingly influential physicians, the Massachusetts legislature appropriated
funds to establish the first such asylum at Worcester.195 The asylum opened in
1833.196 A central figure in the funding deliberations was Horace Mann, a
member of the Massachusetts legislature, who argued for the hospital's
establishment on both humanitarian and fiscal grounds.197 To Mann's mind, the
state should be providing treatment to those insane individuals who could not
188 Id. at9o.
189Id. at 96.
190 Id. at 92.
19 11d. at 99-100.
192 See id.
193 Id. at 102.
1 9 4 See id at 103-05.
195 GROB, supra note 106, at 28.
1 9 6 Id. at43.
197 See id. at 27-28.
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afford the private McLean Asylum, opened in 1818.198 By 1854 another public
hospital, located in Taunton, had also been opened, partly to relieve the
overcrowding that already had begun to plague the Worcester public facility.' 99
We should not assume, however, that the lawmakers' increasingly consistent
stance toward asylums was indicative of any consensus within the medical
community. Experts' opinions about the cause and treatment of insanity varied a
great deal,200 and this diversity sometimes frustrated officials. This was especially
true in the courts. Guardianship was still relied on to protect the property of insane
persons and to save the public treasury from the cost of their support.20 1 But
courts were reluctant to hear the testimony of physicians, and even guardians
were not trusted to speak on the insanity question.2 02 Judges remained adamant
that they could make such a determination only after they personally had
interviewed the individual.203
In the middle of the nineteenth century, a social construction of idiocy
distinct from insanity was evolving. The distinction of idiocy from insanity, or
alternatively as a type of insanity, prompted Massachusetts legislators to
commission a report on idiocy. Samuel Gridley Howe's commissioned report was
published in 1848.204 Howe discussed at some length the difficulty of diagnosing
idiocy, but adopted a definition of idiocy as:
that condition of a human being in which, from some morbid cause in the bodily
organization, the faculties and sentiments remain dormant or undeveloped, so that the
person is incapable of self-guidance, and of approaching that degree of knowledge
usual with others of his age.205
Howe reported on a survey of 63 towns that had identified 574 idiots. By
Howe's estimation, this finding could be extrapolated to conclude that there were
between 1200 and 1500 idiots in the state. Howe portrayed these persons in
sympathetic terms, but with a warning about the potential social consequences of
failing to address the problem of idiocy. Further, he identified idiots as:
one rank of that fearful host which is ever pressing upon society with its suffering, its
miseries, and its crimes, and which society is ever trying to hold off at arm's
198 Seeid at 24-27.
199 See id at 151-53.
200 For a discussion of these opinions, see JIMENBZ, supra note 100, at 65-79.
201 See id at 79-80.
202 See id
203 Id. at 79-80.
2 0 4 SAMUEL GRIDLEY HowE, REPORT MADE TO THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETrs,
UPON IDIOCY (Boston, Coolidge & Wiley 1848).
205 Id. at 20.
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length,-to keep in quarantine, to shut up in jails and almshouses, or, at least, to treat
as a pariah caste; but all in vain.20 6
Moreover, Howe's definition of idiocy inherently contained a public policy
prescription.207 Idiots should be provided education, just as were the other
children of Massachusetts:
Massachusetts admits the right of all her citizens to a share in the blessings of
education, and she provides it liberally for all her more favored children. If some be
blind or deaf, she still continues to furnish them with special instruction at great cost;
and will she longer neglect the poor idiot-the most wretched of all who are born to
her,-those who are usually abandoned by their fellows,--who can never, of
themselves, step up upon the platform of humanity,-will she leave them to their
dreadful fate, to a life of brutishness, without an effort in their behaLf? 208
Soon after the release of Howe's influential report, the Massachusetts legislature
appropriated funds for the construction of the state's first idiot school.20 9
Massachusetts's policy toward the insane, idiots, and other persons with
disabilities was complemented by major initiatives directed toward the
undeserving poor-adults who were not disabled and so were not excused from
the societal expectation that they work.210 Traditional patterns of outdoor relief
(the provision of aid to the poor in their homes or the purchase of custodial care in
the homes of other community members) were replaced with a strong emphasis
on indoor relief-confinement in alnshouses-where a work ethic could be
instilled through forced labor and harsh rules governing personal conduct.211 This
strategy was adopted due to a growing concern that the nondisabled poor's moral
deficiencies were not being addressed through outdoor relief, and that in fact, the
lack of tight controls over their behavior was contributing to their idleness and
profligacy.212
Such beliefs were particularly prominent in regard to Irish and German
immigrants, most of whom arrived in the eastern ports from Baltimore to
Boston. 213 Some six million immigrants had landed on the shores of the United
States between 1800 and 1860, and many Protestants were alarmed by their
206 Id. at 56.
207 Id. at 53.
208 Id
.
209 JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INvENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL
RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1994).
210 SeeTRATrNER, supranote 110, at 54.
211 See id. at 56-58.
212 See id at 54-55.
213 See id at 55-56.
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dissipation and licentiousness.214 The clash of cultures created considerable
backlash to existing poor law, and officials responded by strengthening the
emphasis on institutional care and indoor relief 2 15 In Massachusetts, the trend
toward indoor relief is readily apparent in the growth of alnshouses from 83 in
1824 to 219 in 1860.216
When viewed in their entirety, these late eighteenth and nineteenth-century
developments in thought, attitude, and behavior show an increasingly consistent
stance toward disability, dependency, and deviancy. Society was changing, and
many Massachusetts citizens did not think the changes were always for the better.
The mutations in economic relations, rising concerns about the health and
morality of the immigrant population, and novel concepts about insanity and
idiocy formed the backdrop for alterations in policies toward those who were
disabled, dependent, or deviant. Around the time Massachusetts adopted its first
constitution in 1780, the state began settling into permanent perspectives
regarding these fundamental problems. Among other things, the citizenry adopted
perspectives on dependency that were consistent with the political decisions it
made. It viewed dependency as a deeply troubling phenomenon and struggled
both to establish and maintain standards for respectable behavior and to be
consistently charitable toward the less fortunate. These events and circumstances
allowed the people's representatives to establish the essential qualification for
voting at the 1780 constitutional convention-property ownership. Further, ideas
that later would lead to a disability-based disenfranchisement were beginning to
be articulated, partly through the public policies directed at the dependent
population. These policies had a distinctive form that foreshadowed the eventual
adoption of such a provision.
B. Voter Qualifications before the 1820-1821 Constitutional Convention
As they considered their constitution at the 1780 convention, the people of
Massachusetts confronted many of the essential issues of democratic governance.
These issues included the critical question, "Who decides?"2 17 This question was
addressed in three parts: the apportionment of representatives to the chambers of
government, the determination of qualifications for holding office, and the
specification of qualifications for suffrage.218
214Id. at 55.
2 15 Id. at 55-58.
216 Id. at 59.
2 17 RONALD M. PETERS, JR., THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTUON OF 1780: A SOCIAL
COMPACr34 (1978).
218 Id. at 35.
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Convention delegates proposed two chambers for the state's government, a
house of representatives and a senate.219 Representatives in the house were to be
apportioned to towns in relation to the respective town's population.220 Towns
with 150 rateable polls would have one elected representative, those with 375
rateable polls would have two, and another representative would be allocated for
each additional 225 rateable polls.2 21 Senators would be chosen from senate
districts apportioned on the basis of "the relative tax burden of each district."222
Officeholders had to meet various propertyholding and residency
requirements 23 For example, senators had to have resided in Massachusetts for
five years and have a 300-pound freehold, or a rateable estate of 600 pounds.2 24
Representatives were required to own a freehold of 100 pounds or rateable estates
worth 200 pounds.225 Candidates for governor and lieutenant governor had to
have a freehold of 1000 pounds in the state and to have been state residents for
seven years.2 26
In its first constitution, the state continued to rely on property ownership as
the sign of a man's "deservedness" to vote.227 To vote, a male must be twenty-
one years of age, reside in the town, and own a freehold of three pounds or a
rateable estate of sixty pounds,22 8 which one scholar estimates amounted to
roughly a twelve percent increase over the pre-Revolutionary requirement 29
At least for the time being, these first decisions settled the most important
questions of representation in Massachusetts. Property interests were protected
both by basing the apportionment of senate seats on taxes and by the property-
ownership requirement for suffrage and office holding.230 The interests of towns
were represented by apportioning house seats to them.2 31 Individuals were
assured of representation by the population-based apportionment of house
seats. 232 By dispersing representation across the governmental bodies, the
constitution also attempted to decide the question of political equality for
219 PETERS, supra note 217, at 35.
220 Id
22 1 Id. A person eligible to vote was "arateable poll." Id at 35 n.33.
222 Id. at 35.
223 See BROWN, supra note 96, at 393.
224 PETERS, supra note 217, at 35. All of a man's property constituted his "total rateable
estate." Id. at 34.
225 BROWN, supra note 96, at 393.
226 PETERS, supra note 217, at 35.
227 See BROWN, supra note 96, at 394.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 PETERS, supra note 217, at 36.
23 1 Id.
232 Id.
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individuals (as will become apparent as we examine subsequent developments).
Voting was still seen primarily as an instrument of the common good that ensured
the rights of property holders. In continuing to exercise some constraint on
suffrage, early Massachusetts citizens indicated their belief that voting was not a
right but a prvilege (and to some degree, a responsibility), though there is also
evidence that public opinion was in transition on this point.
The 1780 constitutional convention might be better understood by
considering its political context. During that time, it was generally known who
voted and for whom, since open voting was the norm in Massachusetts during the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.233 Prominent men actively
monitored the polling place, watched the votes cast and, by their presence,
provoked fears of economic reprisals for making the wrong choice.234 Such use
of "force" by Federalist party men is captured in one observer's definition:
By force, I mean an intolerant and oppressive violence towards laborers, tenants,
mechanics, debtors, and other dependents: every species of influence, on every
description of persons, has been practiced, and with a shameless effrontery.
Individuals have been threatened, with a deprivation of employment and an instant
exaction of debt to the last farthing as a Consequence of withholding a federal vote, or
rather of not giving one.235
Political parties also intervened to ensure that their supporters would be allowed
to vote.2 3 6 This sometimes meant that otherwise ineligible men cast votes when
wealthier sponsors vouched for their property holdings. 237
These events fueled criticism of election laws and practices. Observers
repeated the traditional concerns about the influence of wealthy men in political
affairs and often used these occurrences to support their advocacy for property
suffiage requirements.238 In fact, it must be said that the property qualification for
voting was not a controversial topic at the 1780 constitutional convention.23 9 It
was so agreeable to most that "[1]ess than half a dozen towns" objected to the
requirement that adult men be property owners before they be allowed to vote.2 40
Between 1780 and the next constitutional convention in 1820-1821 though,
political winds had shifted and the core issue of representation had to be
reexamined. As a look at the second constitutional convention shows, the
2 3 3 RONALD P. FORMisANO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE:
MASsACHUsETTS PARTIES, 1790s-1840s, at 136 (1983).
234 Id.
235 Id. (emphasis in original).
23 6 See id at 137.
237 Id
.
23 8 See id
23 9 See BROWN, supra note 96, at 396-97.
240 Id at 396.
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discussion of suffrage requirements was framed primarily in terms of the
property-holding requirements believed necessary for ensuring that voters
possessed the necessary moral and intellectual competence to participate in
guarding the common good.
C. The Justification for the Guardianship Exclusion is Transformed:
Comparing the 1820-1821 and 1853 Constitutional Conventions
During discussion of the number of senators to be elected, Mr. Keyes of
Concord proposed to add a pauper exclusion to the qualifications for electors of
the Senate.241 Almost immediately, Mr. Beach of Gloucester moved to add the
phrase "and those under guardianship" to Keyes's language. 242 Thus, the two
categories were linked and stayed so for the remainder of the deliberations.
In later consideration of electoral qualifications, delegates debated a
resolution that would "amend the Constitution as to provide that paupers and
persons under guardianship, shall not be entitled to vote for any officer under the
govemment."243 It was this phrase that prompted a far-ranging discussion of the
qualifications for electors and resulted in the adoption of both the pauper and the
guardianship exclusions.244 It is evident from the official report that it was
property-not insanity or idiocy-that animated the discussion.2 45
Mr. Quincy, a delegate, correctly noted that the proposal could not be
characterized as advocating universal suffrage since women and minors were
prohibited from voting, aphorizing that "[t]he real nature of the proposition is the
exclusion of pecuniary qualification."2 46 Arguing for the imposition of
qualifications, Quincy claimed that disenfranchisement was a just principle,
saying, "Society may make a part of its members obnoxious to laws, and yet deny
them the right of suffrage, without any injustice."247 He went on to argue that
"[i]n its true character, this provision is in favor of the poor, and against the
pauper;-that is to say, in favour of those, who have something, but very little;
against those, who have nothing at all." 248 To Quincy, allowing the poor man to
241 JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES,
CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 115 (Boston, Office of the Daily
Advertiser 1821) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS]. The journal of the
1820-1821 constitutional convention is not a verbatim recording of delegates' remarks, but
rather an observer's summary of them. The journal quotations included here are these official
summaries.
242Id. at 116.
243 Id. at 122.
244 See id. at 122-26.
245 See id
246 Id. at 123.
247 Id.
248 Id.
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vote was consistent with democratic philosophy, but a pauper was a different
matter. He stated:
The theory of our constitution is, that extreme poverty-that is, pauperism-is
inconsistent with independence. It therefore assumes a qualification of a very low
amount, which, according to its theory, is the lowest consistent with independence.
Undoubtedly it excludes some, of a different character of mind. But this number is
very few; and from the small amount of property required, is, in individual cases,
soon compensated. 249
Mr. Quincy was not alone in believing that some line had to drawn based on
economic qualifications. The boundary may have been in dispute, but other
delegates also believed it to be necessary -50 It was not accepted by all the
delegates, however, and some objected. 51 Mr. Austin of Boston supported the
right of the state to establish electoral qualifications but spoke against this
pecuniary qualification for both practical and political reasons. 2 52 Practically
speaking, he said:
The provision could not be carried into effect; it was the cause of perjury and
immorality-it did not prevent a fraudulent man from voting, who owed more than
he was worth, but debarred an honest poor man who paid his debts-and it tended to
throw suspicion of unfairness on the municipal authority. 53
His other concern was more philosophical. He asked:
[What w]ill you do with your labouring men? [hey have no freehold-no property
to the amount of two hundred dollars, but they support their families reputably with
their daily earnings. What will you do with your sailors? Men who labor hard, and
scatter with inconsiderateness the product of their toil, and who depend on the
earnings of the next voyage. What will you do with your young men? who have spent
all their money in acquiring an education? Must they buy their right to vote? Must
they depend on their friends or parents to purchase it for them? Must they wait till
they have turned their intelligence into stock? Shall all these classes of citizens be
deprived of the rights of freemen for want of property? Regard for country... did not
depend upon property, but upon institutions, laws, habits and associations. 254
24 9 Id.
250 See id at 122-26.
251 See id
252 See id at 123-24.
253 d.2.54 Id. at 124.
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Some supported the property requirement on the grounds that it motivated
men to improve their situation in life.255 Mr. Thomdike of Boston, for example,
emphasized the effect of the pecuniary requirement on character development.2 56
He "had long been acquainted with the sea-faring men in a neighboring town," he
said, and "had witnessed there the effect of the provision in the constitution upon
young men under age.... They were generally anxious to amass the little
property necessary to give them the right of voting, and this anxiety had a
favorable effect on their habits and character."2 57 But not every seaman should be
permitted to cast his vote; a property requirement should be high enough to
ensure their independence2 58 If seamen were of the type who "scatter[ed] a great
deal of money and d[id] not save enough," they should not vote2 59 Their votes
would be "the votes of their owners, or of intriguing men who wish either to get
into office themselves or to get their friends in."260
The connection made between property holding, independence, and morality
did not sit well with every delegate.2 61 Mr. Richardson protested that the "[w]ant
of property in a free government, should be the last thing to prevent men from
voting, unless the possession of property were shown to be necessarily connected
with virtue."262 Nonetheless, the delegates persisted in asking whether some
property-related qualification was required to ensure the electorate could be
entrusted with the common good.263 Mr. Ward of Boston reasoned that:
If to require no pecuniary qualification to make a voter was the most likely mode of
securing the best good of the whole, it ought certainly to be adopted. [But o]n the
contrary, if to confine the right of voting to persons who are directly interested in the
protection of the rights of property, as well as of life and liberty, was the most
probable mode of securing the enhancement of just, equal, and useful laws, there
could be no doubt that the people have a right and that it is their duty so to limit the
privilege of suffrage.264
Mr. Baldwin argued that the pertinent test ought to be whether a man had
paid taxes, not whether he owned property, as paying taxes was more consistent
with the Bill of Rights' assertion that "all men are bom free and equal.2 65 This
255 See id at 122-26.
256 Id. at 124.
257 Id.
2 5 8 
rd.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 See id at 122-26.
262 Id. at 124.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 124-25.
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argument held sway, and delegates adopted a taxpaying requirement as the
centerpiece of the suffrage provision.266 The result of the discussion was the
following proposed amendment:
Every male citizen, of twenty one years of age and upwards, (excepting paupers
and persons under guardianship) who shall have resided within the Commonwealth
one year, and within the town or district in which he may claim a right to vote, six
calendar months, next preceding any election of Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Senators or Representatives, and who shall have paid by himself or his parent master
or guardian, any state or county tax, which shall within two years next preceding such
election, have been assessed upon him in any town or district of this Comrnonwealth;
and, also, every citizen who shall be by law exempted from taxation, and who shall be
in all other respects qualified as above mentioned, shall have a right to vote in such
election of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senators and Representatives, and no
other person shall be entitled to vote in such elections. 267
Thus, the delegates of the 1820-1821 constitutional convention adopted as
the central voter qualification provision the idea that those casting ballots in
elections be taxpayers.268 In so doing, they rejected the earlier idea that the
ownership of a certain amount of real and personal property was required to
indicate that one possessed the requisite character to vote. But they were clearly
struggling with emerging ideas about political representation, the potential for
conflict between individual and common interests, and the very nature of early
American institutions of governance.
These ideas surfaced in their consideration of appropriate qualifications for
the electorate. As the above excerpts from the convention record indicate,
delegates considered the suffrage requirement in terms common to the day. The
primary question underlying the discussion was that of independence: Did a man
have the economic wherewithal necessary to exercise independence in political
matters, or was he so dependent on other men for his livelihood or welfare that he
might bend to their wishes? It was important to these delegates that the state's
electorate be free from economic coercion, since only those who were
independent could be endowed with the public trust inherent in electoral
participation.
There were other concerns as well. Economic status was still associated with
moral virtue, at least in some delegates' minds. Some delegates feared that
pecuniary motives might hold undue sway in the political process-voters might
cast ballots on the basis of their own selfish interests and not the greater good.
266 Id.
267 AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTrTUION OF MASSACHUSETTS, PROPOSED BY THE
CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, ASSEMBLED AT BOSTON, ON THE THIRD WEDNESDAY OF
NOVEMBER, A.D. EIGHTEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY 12-13 (Boston, Russell and Gardner
1821).
2 6 8 See id
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Also behind the deliberations were the motivational effects of conditioning voting
rights on economic status: By not requiring some amount of property, would
young men be spurred to acquire the necessary assets to gain the right to vote?
The implications of the suffrage requirement on the political stability of the state
were also weighed, with some delegates expressing fear of the repercussions of
preventing sailors and soldiers from being electors.
This mix of arguments pro and con is notable for one omission. Nowhere in
the record does a delegate refer to those under guardianship with the terms of
"insanity" or "idiocy." Delegates simply did not consider the guardianship
provision from the standpoint of these categorical labels. The entire discussion
was based on the theory that economic ties to the community have a protective
value, both for the virtue of the individual and the polity as a whole. The
philosophy underlying the debate was grounded in the common language of that
era. The evolution of democratic thought had begun to move away from the strict
application of a property-based qualification and toward a more universal (though
still exclusionary) suffrage. The guardianship exclusion was an outgrowth of this
trend. As suffrage expanded, the convention delegates found themselves resisting
truly universal adult suffrage. They could not quite bring themselves to abandon
completely the idea that some controls should be placed on voting privileges.
At the 1853 constitutional convention, delegates again considered the
qualifications of the Massachusetts electorate. The debates here began to take on a
very different hue than the debates at the 1820-1821 convention both with respect
to the guardianship exclusion and another important controversy regarding the
basis for Senate seats. In the 1853 convention, delegates used the terms "idiots"
and "insane" freely. Apparently, there was a shared understanding of the identity
of these individuals. These impairment-based categories were often referred to in
the same breath as women, children, and foreigners, suggesting that delegates
now had a common vocabulary for carrying on the emerging contests over
precisely who would be included in the electorate.2 69 As in debates over slavery,
immigration, women's rights, and so on, these categories were of increasing
importance in national quarrels of all sorts.
The lengthy wrangling of the convention includes frequent mention of these
various groups. That women, "foreigners," children, and the "insane" and "idiots"
were often referred to at the same time reveals the conceptions about intellectual
and moral competence contained within the terms.270 In the debate on
apportioning Senate seats, delegates argued over the nature of political
representation and who had a right to such representation.2 71 Mr. Hallett observed
that other states excluded from representation "children under twenty-one years,
2 6 9 See 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE
CONVENTION ASSEMBLED MAY 4, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTTUTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASsACHUSErrs 221 (Boston, White and Porter 1853).
2 70 See id
271 See id at 218-33.
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idiots and insane, strangers and women, and in another class of States, slaves
also."2 72 One justification for these exclusions, he said, was that these groups
were naturally incapable of participation and were legally restricted in other civil
rights areas:
Children are excluded, from the nature of things.... [This] rule is too universal
to be questioned... [but it] is a temporary exclusion only, removed by the necessary
age, and imposing no burden or acquisition upon the party before he can become a
citizen.
Idiots and insane, and those excluded from society by infamous crimes, are
manifestly not apart of the acting society, and can make no contract.
Women, by the practice of the world and their own modest, dignified, self-
resigning consent, are excluded, though represented by their husbands, parents and
male relations. It is unnecessary to discuss this, because all our governments were
formed without any innovation on this common consent of mankind in all
governments.
Slaves are excluded, for the same reason that minors and incompetent persons
are, because, by the laws of the community in which they are found, they are
incapable of maldng contracts. They are not citizens, and by no qualifications placed
within their reach, by law, can become such.
It follows, that in any organization of government, in a community where slavery
exists, the slaves must of necessity be excluded from political power. They cannot
enter into any political relation. They cannot contract To say they are slaves, is to say
that they are not thought of as beings having a political existence.273
The senate allocation dispute also contains numerous references to the
representation of these groups' interests in the political process. 274 Delegates
argued over whether and how to provide for their presumably legitimate claims
on public attention.275 Some thought it was possible for members of one group
(free white men) to represent other groups.2 76 Typical of the delegates' statements
were those made by Mr. Morton:
Can a man come here and not represent woman? What is representation but a
reflection of the opinions of the district which sends its representative here?... I do
not mean to be extravagant, but it would not be far from the truth to say that we
represent the women and nobody else ....
And not only so, but the children also are represented here....
272 Id. at 221.
273 Id. (emphasis added).
274 See id at 218-33.
275 See id at 223-25.
2 7 6 See id
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*. Are the women and children neglected in legislation? Are the insane and
foreigners neglected in legislation? I apprehend not.277
Delegates also mused about the ancient political idea of guardianship, which
envisions that a political elite would protect the interests of another
nonparticipating group.27 8 Mr. Wallace distinguished between the practice of
representing another's interests as an elected official and serving as guardianship
over those interests, considering representation as a higher-order relationship
between an elected official and voter.2 79 He argued that for those who could not
vote:
[t]he most that can be said of it is, that those persons who are elected, exercise a sort
of guardianship over the women and children and foreigners in their districts. They
are not their representatives. They assume a guardianship, and perhaps it is their duty
to exercise a guardianship over the interests of those who have no voice in the
election; but this is not representation.2 80
Mr. Simonds seemed to have had in mind that persons under a political
"guardianship" were dependent, and further, that dependence was a condition
disqualifying one from the possibility of representation.2 81 He stated:
I find that mankind, in common with all created intelligences, are divided into two
principal classes, the independent and the dependent My idea of sovereignty, then, is,
that those rightfully possess it who stand in the relation of independent in the
community, and not that of dependent I necessarily come to the conclusion, then, that
the female portion of the community are in this condition of dependence, that they
never can, and never ought, rightfully, to be considered as possessing sovereign
power.2 82
Delegates also debated the basis for the right to participate in selecting
representatives.2 8 3 Mr. Bradford questioned who were "the people," and
concluded that the phrase referred to:
that portion of the inhabitants of the country who are capable of instituting,
maintaining, and altering government It did not mean the child who was incapable
for any act towards instituting, supporting, and maintaining government, but referred
to the person, whose mental and physical faculties were more matured, and who was,
2 77 Id. at 225-26.
2 78 See id at 204-13.
2 79 See id at 205-08.
280 Id. at 208.
281 See id at 205-08.
2 8 2 Id. at 210.
283 See id. at 212-13.
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by that very quality of mind, more competent to take a part in the discharge of
government matters. It did not mean the female part of the commtnity, who, by their
physical organism, habits, and more gentle traits of character, are totally unsuited to
take a part in all the departments of government, in war and in peace, and in carrying
out the relations of commerce, and engaging in all the complicated and extensive
business of life .... It was intended to signify the adult male portion of the people,
those who were competent to take part in the management of the affairs of the
government. 284
With respect to specific voter qualifications, the primary issue was whether or
not to recommend repeal of the taxpaying qualification (adopted in 1821 as a
replacement for the property requirement).2 85 The delegates adopted the
committee recommendation that this be done.28 6 Another less contentious
committee recommendation was that the "ability to read and write shall be an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the elective franchise. 287
They also considered the specific cases of "idiots," "insane persons," and
persons convicted of crime.288 Indeed, the Committee on the Qualifications of
Voters had proposed that the relevant constitutional article read, "That no idiot or
insane person, or person convicted of a felony, unless pardoned and restored to
the right of suffrage, shall be entitled to vote in any election."289
Mr. Hathaway reacted to the committee's recommendation by proposing that
the words "idiot or insane person" be replaced with the words "pauper, or person
under guardianship"-in other words, that the existing 1780 language be
retained-because the "only criterion that I know of, or that any one can know of,
by which to settle this question of insanity or idiocy, is the judgment of a tribunal
that is fit to pass upon that matter."290 Hathaway was reluctant to rely on
selectmen for determining whether an individual was an idiot or insane on
election day, preferring instead that this judgment be made by a court in
connection to guardianship status:
[T]he Committee had reported that 'insane persons' should not vote, and the reason
why I wished to substitute for that 'persons under guardianship' was, because I would
not deprive any person of the right to vote upon the judgment of the selectmen, and
because they might believe a person to be idiotic or insane who was not so, and the
2 84 Id. at 212.
285 See id at 546-47.
286 Id. at 680-82. None of the constitutional changes proposed by the 1853 convention
were adopted by the people.
287 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVEmON
AssEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONsTrrUtON OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OFMAssACHUSETrs 251 (Boston, White and Porter 1853).
2 88 See id at 272-73.
289 Id 
.290 Id. at 274.
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only evidence that they should consider as sufficient to deprive any voter of his rights
was a solemn adjudication, by a competent tribunal of law or probate, that the person
was so, and that he was incompetent to vote.2 91
Others echoed Mr. Hathaway's concern about the difficulty of deciding who
was incompetent to vote. 9 2 Mr. Aldrich viewed the difficulty in determining
competency as an insufficient reason for not excluding such individuals. 293
Determining precisely which criminals had been restored to the right of suffrage
was not an easy task, and "it will often be found equally difficult to ascertain who
are insane persons, paupers, or idiots; and yet these several classes of persons are
usually excluded, the difficulty of determination, not being regarded as a
sufficient reason for maling no disqualifying provision respecting them. ' '294
Though the dividing line between competence and incompetence was narrow
and difficult to discern, Mr. Aldrich still viewed the distinction as worth making,
saying:
But all this furnishes no reason why an idiot should be allowed the important and
responsible right of sufflage. Nor should insane persons be permitted to exercise this
right, [simply] because it is not always easy to ascertain whether a person be of a sane
or insane mind. Well, Sir, there are those who deem it equally clear, that that man
who has shown himself; in a sense, morally insane by the commission of flagrant
crimes, ought also to be disfianchised.2 95
The wedge being gradually drawn between pauper status and guardianship
status in suffrage law is evident from the comments of Mr. Keyes who, in
commenting on the proposal to substitute "idiot or insane person" for "paupers
and persons under guardianship," claimed there was no justification for
disenfranchising paupers.2 96 He stated:
I do not know why we should not extend the right of voting to all paupers, because
they have.., more interest in the laws, and in the conduct of the administration of
affairs, than any other class of persons, inasmuch as they are the children of the
government, and affected in their food and their raiment by the laws which are
passed, and therefore, of all people, they have the highest interest in voting.2 97
29 1 Id. at 275.
292 See id at 276-78.
293 See id at 277-78.
294 Id. at 277.
295 Id. at 278.
29 6 See id at 275.
297 Id. Mr. Keyes's remark is prescient. In 1974, the voters of Massachusetts agreed to
repeal the constitutional provision that disenfranchised paupers, but retained the guardianship
exclusion. See, publisher's "Editorial Note" to MAss. CONsT. amend, art. II (Law Co-op 1990).
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The change in the way lawmakers justified the guardianship exclusion is
notable for many reasons. The first and most important reason is the new
association of guardianship with insanity and idiocy in 1853. While these words
appear nowhere in the record of the 1820-1821 convention, they are used
frequently and with facility only three decades later. By mid-century, despite
some uncertainty about exactly how to do so, legislators seemed to believe that
people could be accurately identified as insane or idiotic. Further, they used the
labels adeptly and characterized the two groups as at least intellectually
incompetent, and perhaps morally incompetent as well. The reinterpretation of the
guardianship exclusion-from one based on economic status to one based on
cognitive and emotional impairment-was accomplished quickly and completely.
The terms used to identify who would be affected by the guardianship
exclusion had been transformed. The transformation occurred within the context
of greater political controversies about representation and participation. By 1853,
the quarrel about essential voter qualifications was framed in terms of individual
characteristics such as gender, race, disability, and immigrant status-not the
previous battleground of property. However, it can hardly be said that economic
status no longer mattered. Indeed, it may be that these categorical distinctions
simply replaced the earlier economic ones and served as proxies for them.
In weighing groups' political representation as well as their individual
characteristics, legislators seem to have been reflecting the era's growing concern
about the relative weight of property interests versus other interests. Discussing
the topic in these terms also suggests that attitudes toward the nature of voting
itself were in flux. Voting was not only the means for ensuring the stability and
quality of the republic, it was also a method for individuals to secure the
consideration of issues important to them. This perspective on the purpose of
electoral participation consciously allowed for the notion that the public good
consisted of more than property interests. Proponents of expanded suffrage knew
that some voters would challenge the fundamental value placed on property
rights, and they argued that these interests were just as legitirate.
D. Explaining the New Justification
In 1820-1821, conventional delegates employed the phrase "paupers and
persons under guardianship," thereby indicating the associations they drew
between the economic dependency of those receiving public aid (paupers) and of
those with private resources who might become dependent on public aid (persons
under guardianship). In disenfranchising these groups, legislators seemed to have
believed that they were doing what was necessary to protect and further the
democratic nature of their young state. The changing nature of the rationale for
this exclusion, however, suggests that the legislators of 1853 had quite different
notions of why such "persons under guardianship" should not be permitted to
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vote. How are we to explain the dramatic change in legislators' rationales for the
guardianship exclusion from 1820-1821 to 1853?
The shifting tapestry of social, economic, and political circumstances during
that three-decade period contains several clues for the changing justification. One
powerful causal thread is the broad collection of ideas about the nature of
government and its relationship both to individual citizens and to the citizenry as a
whole. The nineteenth century was marked by significant changes in this regard.
In the fifty years after the Revolution, politics gradually became more democratic,
a process marked by "the breakdown of the deferential style of politics, the
emergence of egalitarian politics, the gradual opening of the political process to
the average citizen, and most importantly, the gradual expansion of suffiage
rights."2 98 During the Jacksonian era beginning in 1828, political parties
mobilized voters of all classes, and campaigns became significant social
events. 29
9
Political philosophy reflected these developments. The civic humanism
tradition had elevated the common good over individual interests, but liberalism
gave center stage to the individual rights to property, free political expression, and
liberty from government interference. 300 Voting was still a civic duty, but
Americans also came to view voting "more as a political right that enabled
individuals to 'protect their interests.' 30 1
But while the electorate was expanding dramatically, states were also
excluding groups for various reasons. Not everyone benefited as voting evolved
from a privilege to a right. Suffrage laws were employed to penalize criminals
and to keep the polls free of corruption-nineteen of 34 states disenfranchised
criminals in 1860.302 African Americans and aliens could vote in only 6 states. 303
Soldiers and sailors were disenfranchised in the majority of states; students in
seven.304 Paupers were excluded from the electorate in 15 states. 305 As late as
1908, women had equal suffrage with men in only 4 states.306 Despite the
298 Donald W. Rogers, Introduction: The Right to Vote in American History, in VOTING
AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 3, 9 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992).
2 9 9 Id.
3 00 id.
301 Id.
302 pORTER, supra note 26, at 147-49.
303 Id. at 148.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Victoria Bissell Brown, Jane Addams, Progressivism, and Woman Suffrage: An
Introduction to "Why Women Should Vote," in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE, 179, 184 (Marjorie
Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995). A petition submitted to the 1853 convention had called for the
removal of the word "male" from all parts of the Massachusetts constitution, which, it was
argued, would have had the effect of enfranchising women. Id. at 189. The Committee on
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abandonment of an overt property requirement in most states, the
disenfranchisement of these groups enforced standards of intellectual and moral
competence.
Consistent with these fundamental political developments were the notions
about insanity and idiocy that were crystallizing during the nineteenth century,
particularly in its middle decades. Insanity itself was in conceptual transition,
changing from a spiritual malady to a medical one. New scientific approaches and
professional methods promised to cure insanity (a promise that went unrealized).
This optimistic outlook was tempered, however, by the concomitant belief that
the insane were somehow at least partly to blame for their condition.
Similarly, popular and elite conceptions of idiocy were imbued with negative
connotations. Idiocy was a threat to the social order, though the public bore some
responsibility to correct the situation through education of idiots. Idiots were
hardly expected to occupy places of status in the community, but reformers
believed that the social harm caused by idiocy could be reduced dramatically
through science and professional help. Nonetheless, idiocy was conceived as, at
best, an unfortunate condition, and, at worse, a sign of moral and intellectual
decay.
With respect to both idiocy and insanity, then, connotations were so negative
that even the most progressive thinkers of the time recognized that the survival
and betterment of humanity required that they be managed. At the forefront of
such reform movements was Horace Mann, an influential individual at the center
of Massachusetts political decision making. As a state legislator, Mann chaired a
committee appointed to look into the treatment of the insane307 and was "mainly
responsible" for the founding of Worcester State Lunatic Hospital.308 He was
later appointed to the state board of education and, as secretary, issued a number
of widely read reports. 309
Mann's ideas about idiocy and insanity are well worth noting, not only
because of his prominence in Massachusetts political affairs, but also because of
his influence on the political and social elite in Massachusetts and other states.
His ideas-and their implications for political participation-may be understood
from his writings. In his report entitled Political Education, Mann emphasized the
civic purposes that public schooling could and should serve.310 A proponent of
making schools a tool of democracy, he viewed education as a requirement for a
Qualification of Voters responded to the petition by ignoring it and refusing to recommend any
change that would have permitted women to vote. Id. at 189.307 See GROB, supra note 106, at 26.
3 0 8 GERALD N. GROB, EDWARD JARVIS AND THE MEDICAL WORLD OF NINETEENTH-
CENiURYAMERICA 119 (1978).
309 See GROB, supra note 106, at 35.
3104 HORACE MANN, Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Board of Education of
Massachusetts for the Years 1845-1848, in LIFE AND WORKS OF HORACE MANN 268 (Boston,
Lee and Shepard 1891).
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self-governing republic.311 He feared a government that did not attend to the need
to educate its citizenry, writing:
Nothing would be easier than to follow in the train of so many writers, and to
demonstrate by logic, by history, and by the nature of the case, that a republican form
of government, without intelligence in the people, must be, on a vast scale, what a
mad-house, without superintendent or keepers, would be on a small one,--the
despotism of a few succeeded by universal anarchy, and anarchy by despotism, with
no change but from bad to worse.312
Mann had decided, though, that men with the requisite orientation and
education might successfully engage in governing themselves.313 "If asked the
broad question, whether man is capable of self-government," Mann said he would
"answer it conditionally":
If by man, in the inquiry, is meant the Feejee Islanders; or the convicts at Botany Bay,
or the people of Mexico and of some of the South American Republics (so called); or
those as a class, in our own country, who can neither read nor write; or those who can
read and write, and who possess talents and an education by force of which they get
treasury, or post-office, or bank appointments, and then abscond with all the money
they can steal; I answer unhesitatingly that man, or rather such men, are not fit for
self-government ... But if, on the other hand, the inquiry be, whether mankind are
not endowed with those germs of intelligence and those susceptibilities of goodness,
by which, under a perfectly practicable system of cultivation and training they are
able to avoid the evils of despotism and anarchy; and also, of those frequent changes
in national policy which are but one remove from anarchy; and to hold steadfastly on
their way in an endless career of inprovement,-then, in the full rapture of that joy
and triumph which springs from a belief in the goodness of God and the progressive
happiness of man, I answer, they are able.3 14
Like many of his day, Mann seemed quite comfortable with the general
notion that the right to participate in self-governance should be regulated.315
Truly universal suffrage was perhaps a possibility, but only if certain conditions
were met.316 The ballot, he said, had "destructive potency [in the] hands of an
ignorant and a corrupt people."317 Universal suffrage was dangerous "without
mental illumination and moral principle." 318 Economic independence was also a
311 Id. at 268-69.
312Id. at 269.
3 13 See id at 355-56.
3 14 Id. (emphases in original).
3 15 See id at 356-57.
3 16 Seeid. at 358-59.
3 17 Id. at 359.
3 18 Id.
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virtue because it allowed for political independence.3 19 In its absence, Mann
feared the dependent might "vote from malice, or envy, or wantonness," which
would involve "substantially the moral guilt of treason."320 Those who exercised
such undue influence over dependent men also bore burdens, theirs being
"baseness" and "subordination of treason."321
Mann's common claim throughout his writing on this subject was that a
republican government absolutely must commit itself to the moral and intellectual
improvement of its citizenry.322 Otherwise it was doomed. 323 "[W]ithout
additional knowledge and morality," he wrote, 'hings must accelerate from
worse to worse."324 If there was "universal suffrage, there must be universal
elevation of character, intellectual and moral, or there will be universal
mismanagement and calamity.' 325
Mann's views provide us with some indication of how a prominent figure
viewed the concepts and political implications of insanity and idiocy. Mann was
well known at the time for his progressive stance on a wide range of issues, but
differed from others in his more vociferous support for public education. His
advocacy was founded not only on the idea that education was the basis for
intellectual and economic advancement, but also on the notion that it was so
important to the functioning of a republic. It inoculated democratic governance
from much of what was feared about it. An educated citizenry staved off the more
demagogic and destructive elements in society. It would provide a bulwark of
stability and legitimacy in the face of challenges to its best impulses. In short, an
effective system of public schooling would tip the balance between the beauty of
republic government and the uglier forms of political organization.
Mann's ideas probably did not significantly differ from those of the rest of
Massachusetts's elite in one important respect. Even when rhapsodizing over the
possibility of the common man's ability to participate ably and effectively in self-
government, one senses an ambivalence about that very ability. There is
confusion and caution at the same time there is optimism and hope. Yes, there
should be faith in the future of democratic goverance... but surely there are
limits?
Horace Mann, as well as many others, such as delegates to state constitutional
conventions, spoke with what was most likely a common thought: there may very
well be limits on the ability to participate. And as the early citizens of
Massachusetts weighed the relative merits of restricting participation on the basis
3 19 See id at 364.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 See id at 365-66.
323 See id at 366.
324Id. at 365.
325 Id. at 366.
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of property holding and, later, tax paying and the restrictions of the 1820-1821
constitution, they were making the difficult choices involved in specifying
precisely where they believed those limits to be. They decided first that there must
be some limits on participation-a decision originating in their doubts, not their
faith; and second, that one of those limits would be based on idiocy and
insanity-another decision originating in doubt.
Coincidentally, the new concepts of idiocy and insanity came to the fore at
about the same time as did particularities of gender and race. This is perhaps the
most significant aspect of the Massachusetts story told in this article. As the
nation's states were exercising their constitutional prerogative to establish voter
qualifications, they were casting about for ways to realize the promise of the new
political order expressed in the soaring language of the country's founders and
leaders. They were successful in some respects, primarily in moving away from
the deliberate preference for economic privilege, but much less so in others.
Until now, we have believed that the major failings in suffrage laws were the
formal gender and racial distinctions adopted after the American Revolution.
There can be no doubt that these prejudices were deep-seated and long-lived, and
their difficult legacy is still with us. It has taken the force of constitutional
amendments and far-reaching legislation to address the enormity of these
distinctions, and the battle is far from won.
Our purpose here is to suggest that the Massachusetts story exposes another
prevalent form of discrimination in state electoral qualification laws, one based on
intellectual and emotional impairment. Its presence today in the statutes and
constitutions of forty-four states326 suggests that disability is a powerful idea in
the imagination of the public and the public's representatives. We argue,
however, that it is an artificial dividing line between those believed to be
"competent" and those believed to be "incompetent. '327
Perhaps the outcome of the Massachusetts story would have been different
had the delegates to the 1853 convention not had the original "paupers and
persons under guardianship" language from 1820-1821 with which to contend. It
is an intriguing question. The 1853 delegates deliberated during a time of
326 Schriner, Democratic Dilemmas, supra note 3, at 439.
327 We will not address the constitutionality of this distinction here; however, see Kay
Schriner, Lisa A. Ochs & Todd G. Shields, The Last Suffrage Movement: Voting Rights for
People with Cognitive and Emotional Disabilities, 27 PUBLIUS 3 (1997). We also raise the issue
of the necessity of maldng this distinction in state law. Six states (Colorado, Indiana, Kansas,
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania) do not disenfranchise specific individuals with
cognitive or emotional impairments and apparently suffer no ill effects. Further, if states require
some measure of protection for the intelligence of the electorate, they might follow the
suggestion of the American Bar Association to establish objective tests at the point of
registration. Any potential voter who can provide the information required to register (with
appropriate accommodations for those who need assistance) should be permitted to vote.
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transition from an almost unquestioning acceptance of the necessity of a property-
holding requirement to more contemporary ideas about the right to vote and its
role in ensuring political representation. Given that the. original guardianship
exclusion had been based on economic grounds, might the Massachusetts
delegates of 1853 have avoided the discussion of "idiots" and "insane" people if
the guardianship exclusion had not been there for them to transform?
If the experience of the other states is any guide, we would have to conclude
that the Massachusetts constitution probably would have come to include a
disability-based exclusion of some variety. Given the proclivity of the states to
adopt such exclusions during the mid-eighteenth century, there is good reason to
think that Massachusetts would have made this distinction in any case. The record
makes it obvious that there was concern about the competency of people labeled
as idiots and insane. Intellectual and moral competency were fundamental criteria
for participation, and idiots and insane people had neither. Like other distinctions
of the time, the Massachusetts guardianship exclusion perpetuated a mythology
that the health of the republic depended on keeping some people from taking part
in governing.

